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Amendments to the Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws Under the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988
Charlene Barshefsky*
Nancy B. Zucker **
In this article, the authors review the changes that the Omnibus Trade Bill
would make to current antidumping and countervailing duty law. Ms. Bar-
shefsky and Ms. Zucker give a background of the law as enacted in the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 and the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. The authors
then provide a detailed legislative history of the Omnibus Trade Bill's principal
amendments to the existing law of antidumping and countervailing duties.
I. Introduction
The antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws are
regularly invoked by U.S. producers seeking relief from unfair trade
practices.' Although generally viewed as the most effective of the
trade law remedies against unfair foreign competition, 2 there have
* Partner, Steptoe &Johnson, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1972, University of Wiscon-
sin; J.D., 1975, Catholic University.
** Associate, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1965, Connecticut Col-
lege; J.D., 1986, American University.
I Between 1980 and 1986, 658 antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD)
petitions had been filed; 219 AD and CVD orders and suspension agreements were in
effect as of February 1987. See Comprehensive Trade Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 652 (1987) [hereinafter
1987 House Hearings].
2 Other trade law remedies include section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 133 7a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), section 406(a) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982)), section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982)), and section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
Section 337 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importa-
tion or sale of merchandise which either substantially injures or destroys a healthy U.S.
industry, prevents its establishment, or restrains or monopolizes U.S. trade. The Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) investigates the allegations, unless the acts are within the
purview of the AD/CVD laws, in which case it will not institute or will terminate its investi-
gation. It may exclude articles from entry or issue cease and desist orders, subject to
Presidential disapproval. Section 337 is most typically used to halt the importation of arti-
cles in violation of a valid U.S. patent or copyright. Section 337 has been amended by
section 1342 of the Omnibus Trade and Competititiveness Act of 1988, see infra note 5, at
H 1895, in order to improve its effectiveness in cases involving intellectual property protec-
tion. Among the changes are deletion of the injury requirement, authorization to issue
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been numerous attempts by U.S. industries to amend and strengthen
the laws. United States industry activity was particularly evident dur-
ing consideration of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 3 the Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984,4 and the present Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988. 5 Debate on all three Acts focused to vary-
ing degrees on specific provisions of the then-existing laws and the
manner in which those provisions might more effectively protect U.S.
cease and desist and consent orders for a single violation, and the availability of default
procedures.
Under section 201 (the "escape clause"), the ITC investigates allegations that articles
are being imported into the U.S. in such "increased quantities" as to be a "substantial
cause" or threat of"serious injury" to domestic producers of a like or directly competitive
article. Following an affirmative ITC determination and recommendation for relief, the
President must decide what relief, if any, is to be provided to the U.S. industry. His action
is subject to disapproval under a joint resolution of Congress (which requires a two-thirds
majority in both Houses). Under the Omnibus Act, section 201 has been amended to
encourage efforts by the domestic industry to "adjust" to import competition. In addition,
provisional relief for perishable agricultural commodities is authorized, certain ITC inves-
tigative and postinvestigative procedures are altered, and Presidential action is modified.
Omnibus Act, infra note 5, § 1401, at H1899.
Section 232 authorizes restraints on articles imported in such quantitites or under
such circumstances as to threaten to impair national security. The Secretary of Com-
merce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, must investigate and report his find-
ings and recommendations to the President within one year of receiving a petition or
otherwise initiating an investigation under section 232. Under present law, there is no
time limit for Presidential action. The Omnibus Act amends section 232 by, inter alia,
reducing the investigatory period from twelve to six months, enhancing the role of the
Secretary of Defense, and requiring the President to decide whether to take action within
90 days of receiving the Secretary's report. Omnibus Act, infra note 5, § 1501, at H 1908-
09.
Section 406 provides for an ITC investigation and discretionary Presidential relief in
cases involving imports from Communist countries which are causing "market disrup-
tion." Market disruption exists when rapidly increasing imports are a significant cause of
material injury to the domestic producer of a "like" or directly competitive article. Under
the Omnibus Act, section 406 has been amended to define the terms "rapidly" and "sig-
nificant cause," and to clarify the factors which the ITC must consider in determining
market disruption. Omnibus Act, infra note 5, § 1411, at H 1904.
Section 301 authorizes the President to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements
and to respond to foreign acts or practices which are unjustifiable, unreasonable, or dis-
criminatory, and which burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Under the Omnibus Act, sec-
tion 301 has been amended by transferring the authority to make determinations, to
engage in decision-making, and to implement relief from the President to the United
States Trade Representative (USTR). Other section 301 amendments include mandatory
action for foreign trade agreements violations and other unjustifiable practices, subject to
certain exceptions; a reduction in and imposition of time limits for action; an expansion of
actionable practices; the addition of modification, termination, and monitoring authority;
and the addition of a "super 301" provision as a way to identify and respond to trade
liberalization priorities. Omnibus Act, infra note 5, §§ 1301-1304, at H 1881-87.
3 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1982) and elsewhere in 19 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1979
Act].
4 The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984) (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1671-1677h (Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter 1984 Act].
5 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 1342, 133 CONG. REC. H 1883-2008 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988) [hereinafter Omnibus
Act].
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industry competitiveness without violating U.S. international
obligations.
As with previous trade law legislation, the current Omnibus Act
spawned much debate among U.S. industries, the Administration,
and the Congress as to the precise types and extent of trade law
changes necessary to further increase the effectiveness of the AD and
CVD laws. Even more so than its predecessor legislation, however,
the Act ultimately accepted by Congress reflects, in the authors'
views, first, a general belief that the AD and CVD laws are already, by
and large, effective tools against unfair foreign practices; and, sec-
ond, that U.S. trade law changes must be GATT6 compatible. As a
result, more contentious amendments, many of which were consid-
ered and rejected by Congress in 1984, were either again defeated or
substantially modified. The concerns that mitigated against their
passage in 1984, persisted: certain provisions would have allegedly
violated U.S. international obligations under the GATT, and the
Subsidies 7 or Antidumping Codes; some were thought likely to pro-
voke retaliation against U.S. exports or the enactment of mirror leg-
islation by various trading partners;9 and some were viewed as too
special-interest oriented.' 0 By contrast, the provisions which remain
in the Omnibus Act tend to shore up various aspects of the AD and
CVD laws without altering their fundamental thrust.
This article will review the principal AD and CVD amendments
proposed in the House and Senate bills, both those which survived
Conference Committee action for ultimate inclusion in the final Om-
nibus Act, and those which did not. I I It will describe the genesis of
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-I 1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
7 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 530, T.I.A.S.
No. 9619 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
8 Agreement on Interpretation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650 (entered into force Jan.
1, 1980) [hereinafter Antidumping Code].
9 See Mastering The World Economy: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th
Cong., I st Sess. 67 (1987) (statement by United States Trade Representative (USTR) Clay-
ton Yeutter).
10 For example, among the proposals considered by the conferees was the "Domenici
amendment" which created a new cause of action under section 301 for "subsidized for-
eign excess capacity." See 133 CONG. REc. S9367 (daily ed. July 8, 1987). While the
amendment attracted support from various industrial sectors, the conferees ultimately re-
jected its inclusion in the Omnibus Act as, inter alia, too special-interest oriented. The
provision was viewed as the "copper amendment." See Senate Offer on Phase II Issues
(Mar. 15, 1988).
11 H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), which was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives in 1986, was reintroduced as H.R. 3, the "Trade and International Economic
Policy Reform Act," on January 6, 1987. Following markup by several House Committees
and consideration on the floor, the full House passed H.R. 3 on May 5, 1987. The provi-
sions of S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S1852 (daily ed. Feb. 5 1987), as
reported by the Senate Finance Committee on June 11, 1987, and those of other Senate
committees were reintroduced as S. 1420, "The Omnibus Trade Act of 1987," onJune 23,
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the debate surrounding each of these provisions, the views of con-
gressional and Administration officials, and, where the issue was par-
ticularly controversial, the concerns expressed by interested business
groups and labor organizations. The article then reviews relevant
Conference Committee activity and highlights areas of compromise.
The authors conclude that the AD and CVD provisions contained in
the Omnibus Act tend to reflect a reasoned and measured response
to the problems of dumping and subsidization.
II. Background
As a predicate to reviewing the trade law proposals at issue, it is
helpful briefly to outline the scope of the U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty laws.
A. The Antidumping Law
Dumping is traditionally defined as price discrimination between
national markets;' 2 that is, the practice of selling the same or similar
merchandise at different prices in different regions. This term ap-
plies both to price discrimination between a producer's home and
export markets as well as to discrimination among the producer's
export markets. The exporter that dumps its merchandise in foreign
markets seeks to maximize its profits or gain a competitive advantage
in the marketplace by charging different prices in different countries
for the same or similar merchandise.' 3 The U.S. antidumping law
also encompasses import pricing which, even though not lower than
prices charged by the exporter in other countries, is below the ex-
porter's cost of producing the merchandise.
1987. This bill [hereinafter Senate Bill], with floor amendments, was passed and inserted
as an amendment to H.R. 3 [hereinafter House Bill] by the Senate on July 21, 1987. The
Conference Committee met intermittently beginning in September 1987, and then actively
throughout March and April of 1988, to reconcile differences between the House and Sen-
ate versions of the trade bill. The final Omnibus Act was passed by the House on April 21,
1988, by a vote of 312 to 107, and by the Senate on April 27, 1988, by a vote of 63 to 36,
with one abstention.
12 The standard work in this area isJ. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1923 & reprinted 1966).
For a comprehensive treatment of dumping, from which the instant discussion and
footnotes were excerpted, see Barshefsky & Cunningham, The Prosecution of Antidumping
Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307 (1981).
13 C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 166-67 (6th ed. 1978).
Although dumping is often described as selling at a lower price in one national market
than in another, this description is both over- and under-inclusive. A lower export price,
compared to the home market price, may well be justified by more favorable credit terms,
sales conditions, and the like, for export transactions. On the other hand, a producer that
sells at a higher price abroad than at home may still be vulnerable to dumping charges if
the export price does not fully reflect the extra costs of the export transaction. Cf. Viner,
Memorandum on Dumping, annexed to DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 347
(1966). The underlying concept is that the prices compared must be adjusted to compen-
sate for differences in the costs of manufacturing and marketing betbre adequate price
comparisons among national markets can be made.
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While dumping is often synonymous with price discrimination,
the prosecution of an-antidumping action consists of two elements:' 4
first, assuming the simplest case, a determination by the Department
of Commerce (Commerce) that the foreign exporter has, in fact, dis-
criminated in price between its home market sales and sales to the
United States;' 5 and second, a determination by the International
Trade Commission (ITC or Commission) that a domestic industry
has been materially injured or threatened with material injury or that
an industry in the United States has been materially retarded by rea-
son of the alleged sales at less than fair value (LTFV).
B. The Countervailing Duty Law
The U.S. countervailing duty law is intended to offset the com-
petitive advantage conferred on imported merchandise whenever a
foreign government (or a person, corporation, or association within
that country) directly or indirectly subsidizes the manufacture, pro-
duction, or exportation of that merchandise.' 6 The CVD law pro-
scribes two forms of assistance: export subsidies and domestic
subsidies. Export subsidies are tied to or are contingent upon the
export performance of an industry in the foreign country, and typi-
cally consist of financial, tax, or other incentives designed to foster
the exportation of merchandise to the United States. Under U.S.
law, export subsidies are essentially countervailable per se.
Domestic subsidies, on the other hand, are not contingent upon
14 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
15 To the extent home market sales are inadequate in number to form a basis for
price comparison, whether by reason of a simple dearth of home market sales or because a
significant portion of those sales have been made at prices below the cost of production,
the computation of a true home market price may not be possible. In such a case, Com-
merce examines sales to third countries, or utilizes a constructed value approach. See 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
16 The 1979 Act, supra note 3, was enacted to implement the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures reached during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations. The current version of section 1671 states that if:
(1) the administering authority determines that-
(A) a country under the Agreement, or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or a
corporation . . . organized in such a country, is providing, directly or
indirectly, a subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or ex-
portation of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to
be sold) for importation, into the United States, and
(2) the Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materi-
ally retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise, or by reason of
sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the
net subsidy.
19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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export performance, but are provided to exporters and
nonexporters alike as a means of reducing overall production
costs. 1 7 Unlike export subsidies, in order to be actionable, a domes-
tic subsidy must be "sector specific"-that is, provided to "a specific
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries." It must
also be paid or bestowed, directly or indirectly on the "manufacture,
production or export" of the product at issue.' 8 Examples of do-
mestic subsidies include the provision by government of equity or
debt financing to a specific enterprise on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations, the making up of a company's net oper-
ating losses, or the assumption by the government of specific con-
tractual obligations previously held by a corporation.
As in the case of dumping, evidence of subsidization is evaluated
by the Department of Commerce. Unlike the AD law, however, there
is no blanket entitlement to a material injury test.' 9 An ITC injury
finding is only required for those countries which are signatories to
the GATT Subsidies Code or which provide reciprocal benefits to
the United States.20
17 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982) provides as follows:
(5) Subsidy. The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term
"bounty or grant" as that term is used in section 1303 of this title, and in-
cludes, but is not limited to, the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (re-
lating to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by
government action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enter-
prises or industries, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether
paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production,
or export of any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms
inconsistent with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating
losses sustained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture,
production, or distribution.
18 See id. § 1677(5)(B).
19 The term "material injury" is defined in the Trade Agreements Act as a harm
which is not "inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)
(1982).
20 See supra notes 16-17. The 1979 Act, supra note 3, added a new Title VII, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-1 6 7 7 g, to the countervailing duty law, which previously had consisted of the
Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618 § 331, 88 Stat. 1978, 2049-52 (1975). Section 303 provides for the imposition
of countervailing duties to offset "bounties or grants" provided by a foreign government
to products made within its nation that are imported into the United States. Section 303
contains no injury test requirement. Although the GATT" requires such a determination
before countervailing duties may be levied, it exempts preexisting legislation from this
rule. The Subsidies Code, however, prohibits the imposition of countervailing duties on
signatories in the absence of an injury determination. Subsidies Code, supra note 7, pt. II,
arts. 4(4), 6.
In response to this (along with other provisions of the agreements reached in the
Tokyo Round), section 303 was restricted to products from countries that are not "coun-
tries under the Agreement" as defined in section 701 (b) of the 1979 Act, supra note 3, 19
1988] ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
With this brief overview in mind, the following sections will ad-
dress the principal amendments to the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws contained in the Omnibus Act,2 ' as well as those
proposed but not accepted. As will be seen, the provisions ulti-
mately approved by the conferees are substantially more moderate in
reach than those contained in either the original Senate or House
bills.
III. Antidumping Provisions
A number of proposed amendments to the antidumping statute
would have significantly altered its substance and administration.
U.S.C. § 167 1(b) (1982). Title VII, which contains an injury requirement, governs imports
from Subsidies Code signatory nations and from nations that have reached an agreement
with the United States with obligations substantially equivalent to those imposed by the
Subsidies Code, or that have met the requirements of section 701(b)(3) of the Act, 19
U.S.C. § 1671(b)(3) (1982) (concerning preexisting unconditional most-favored-nation
agreements).
Note that the House and Senate conferees agreed to section 334 of the Senate Bill,
supra note 11, which permits the USTR to revoke the injury test for any country that vio-
lates a Subsidies Code commitment it has undertaken with respect to the United States, if
the foreign country does not honor, or announces it does not intend to honor, its obliga-
tions. Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1314, at H 1888, See alsoJoint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of Conference, 133 CONG. REC. H2013-43, at 2031 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988) [here-
inafterJoint Conference Statement]. The conferees also agreed to section 169(b) of the House
Bill, supra note 11, which requires the USTR to review Subsidies Code commitments made
to the United States, and to report to Congress on whether such commitments have been
met, the time frames for compliance, and any recommendations on how to improve com-
mitments policy. Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1336(b), at H 1895; see also Joint Conference
Statement, at H2041-42. Section 168 of the House Bill, supra note 11, which was dropped in
conference, would have retroactively applied the injury test to imports from countries
which assumed Subsidies Code or equivalent obligations after a CVD order was issued, or
during pending investigations.
21 The conferees agreed to three provisions of general applicability to the antidump-
ing and countervailing duty laws. The first requires any person submitting factual infor-
mation in an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding to certify that such
information is accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge. House Bill,
supra note 11, § 161; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 328; Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1331,
at H 1894; see alsoJoint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2040. The second provision
requires (current law permits) that Commerce and the ITC release to parties, under ad-
ministrative protective order, all business proprietary information presented to or ob-
tained by it in the course of an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding, with a
limited exception for privileged or classified information, or information for which there is
a clear and compelling need to withhold disclosure. House Bill, supra note 11, § 158; Sen-
ate Bill, supra note 11, § 327; Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1332, at H 1894; see also Joint
Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2040. The third requires Commerce to establish
procedures for the correction of ministerial errors within a reasonable time. House Bill,
supra note 11, § 163; Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1333, at H1894; see also Joint Conference
Statement, supra note 20, at H2041. Commerce has recently published draft regulations
esablishing such procedures. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,207 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1985), 51 Fed. Reg.
29,046 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1986). A fourth general provision would have required Com-
merce to explain, in its decisions, any significant deviation from established administrative
precedent. House Bill, supra note 11, § 162. This House proposal was dropped in confer-
ence; it is the view of the conferees, however, that Commerce and the ITC should provide
a full explanation of the rationale for their determinations. See Joint Conference Statement,
supra note 20, at H2043.
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Examples include provisions that would have changed the manner in
which certain antidumping price comparisons were to be made (Hol-
lings ESP amendment); imposed responsibility on U.S. end purchas-
ers for duty liability in certain cases; instituted broad-scale
monitoring of multiple dumping offenders, coupled with the self-ini-
tiation by Commerce of expedited antidumping investigations; and
created a more effective private right of action for dumping under
the Antidumping Act of 1916. Ultimately, the conferees rejected
such radical alterations to the law, and instead confined their activity
to making certain clarifications in the law, as well as to responding to
perceived deficiencies in applying present antidumping methodology
to nonmarket economy imports and imports of short life cycle
products.
A. Measuring Dumping Margins of Nonmarket Economy Imports
As noted earlier,22 in the simplest antidumping case Commerce
must determine whether the foreign producer has discriminated in
price between its home market and export sales. To this end, Com-
merce will compare (after appropriate adjustments) a foreign pro-
ducer's home market prices with the prices at which the merchandise
is sold by that producer in the United States. 23 If, after making the
appropriate price comparisons, Commerce determines that dumping
has occurred, and if the ITC finds that the U.S. industry producing
comparable merchandise is being injured by reason of the dumping,
Commerce will issue an antidumping duty order.24 The order di-
rects Customs to assess duties on the imported product equal to the
difference between the producer's adjusted foreign market value and
its U.S. prices (the dumping margin). 25
22 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
23 Under current law, Commerce cannot take into account in determining the foreign
market value of the imported goods any sale or offer for sale that is intended to establish a
fictitious market. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (1982 and Supp. IV 1986); 19 C.F.R. § 353.18
(1987). The House receded to section 336 of the Senate Bill which provides that Com-
merce may consider as evidence of the establishment of a fictitious market the occurrence
of different home market price movements for different forms of a product subject to an
antidumping duty order if the movements appear to reduce the dumping margin. Omni-
bus Act, supra note 5, § 1319, at H1889; see alsoJoint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at
H2033.
24 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2) (1982).
25 The amount of duties owing on imported merchandise is determined in the con-
text of annual reviews conducted pursuant to section 751 of the 1979 Act (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Prior to the first review, the cash
deposit to be posted on all entries of the merchandise is based upon the dumping margin
found in the case. After the first review, the weighted average margin computed on the
basis of actual duties assessed on the merchandise will form the amount of the cash de-
posit to be posted in the ensuing year, and so forth. Under present law, Commerce is
authorized, in certain instances, to review an antidumping order within 90 days of its issu-
ance rather than await the annual review. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The
results of the expedited review would then serve as the basis of the estimated antidumping
duties that must be deposited, until the next annual review, if one is requested. Section
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Cases involving dumped imports from nonmarket economy
countries (NMEs) are unique because domestic costs and prices in an
NME are not based upon market factors, and thus do not provide a
proper basis of comparison with an NME's U.S. sales prices. The
nonconvertibility of an NME's currency also prevents Commerce
from making antidumping price comparisons on a U.S.-dollar basis,
as is necessary for dumping computation and duty assessment pur-
poses. Therefore, to determine whether NME imports are being
dumped, Commerce uses a "surrogate country" methodology in
which prices of the merchandise in or from a market economy coun-
try are used to determine the foreign market value of the subject
imports.2 6 Under this methodology, Commerce will examine do-
mestic prices or export prices (domestic prices are preferred) from a
market economy country at a stage of economic development com-
parable to that of the NME under investigation.2 7 The relevant
prices in that market economy are used as a substitute for NME
home market prices, and it is against these surrogate prices that the
NME's U.S. sales are measured in order to determine whether dump-
ing has occurred.
When actual verifiable domestic or export prices are not avail-
able from a comparable surrogate country,28 Commerce may use a
standard constructed value approach as a substitute for home market
pricing data, based upon costs of production in the surrogate coun-
try (costs of materials, labor, and general expenses) plus a minimum
eight percent profit and ten percent overhead factor.29 If the mer-
chandise is not produced in a comparable market economy, Com-
merce may use constructed value based on the "factors of
331 of the Senate Bill, supra note 11, to which the House receded, limits the circumstances
under which Commerce may institute expedited reviews, to cases in which:
(1) the original investigation was not designated as extraordinarily
complicated;
(2) the final antidumping duty determination was not postponed be-
cause of a request by the exporters;
(3) the foreign manufacturer or exporter provides credible evidence
that the dumping margin will decline as a result of the review; and
(4) the review would be based on representative sales that are sufficient
for purposes of comparison.
Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2038; see also Omnibus Act, supra note 5,
§ 1325, at H1892; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 331.
26 The relevant statutory provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982), entitled "State-con-
trolled economies," provides that when the economy of such a country is controlled to the
extent that fair market value cannot be determined, Commerce is to use either a surrogate
country or constructed value methodology. See also 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1987).
27 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (1982).
28 This is often the case since third country producers, which are under no legal com-
pulsion to provide data to Commerce, are generally reluctant to divulge pricing and other
sensitive data to the U.S. Government for use in a trade action in which they have no
involvement or interest. See S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1987) [hereinafter
S. REP.] (report of the Senate Finance Committee on S. 490).
29 19 C.F.R. § 353.6 (1987).
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production" 3 0 incurred in producing the merchandise in the NME,
valued according to costs and prices in a market economy that is
"reasonably comparable" in economic development to the NME. 3l
Alternatively, Commerce may use prices or constructed value based
upon a market economy's sales to or costs of production in the
United States. Whatever the surrogate value chosen (domestic
prices, export prices, or constructed value), Commerce will compare
that value to the NME's sales prices to the United States in assessing
whether and to what extent a dumping margin exists.
For many years, it has been recognized that the surrogate coun-
try methodology creates unpredictability for both nonmarket suppli-
ers (and their U.S. importers), and for the competing domestic
industry.3 2 Because Commerce's method for establishing foreign
market value is largely discretionary and precedent is of limited use,
an exporter cannot typically gauge in advance whether a particular
export price will trigger an antidumping action. Nor, by the same
token, is the potential petitioner able to predict with any certainty
the probable outcome of its case.33 As a result of these deficiencies,
numerous proposals have been advanced in previous Congresses as
well as in the current session to make administration of the NME
antidumping provisions more predictable.3 4
While the House bill did not contain an NME dumping provi-
sion, the Senate, the Administration, and various business groups
put forward several alternative pricing formulations to replace the
surrogate country methodology. The Senate proposed a pricing
benchmark test.3 5 If Commerce determined that foreign market
value (FMV) in the NME could not be accurately determined under
the normal methodology, the calculation of FMV would be made us-
ing a pricing benchmark based on the trade-weighted average price
of arms-length sales in the United States of comparable3 6 merchan-
30 Id. § 353.8(c).
si See, e.g., Barium Carbonate from the PRC, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,913 (Int'l Trade Admin.
1984) (final determination); Barium Chloride from the PRC, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,728 (Int'l
Trade Admin, 1984) (preliminary determination); Potassium Permanganate from the PRC,
48 Fed. Reg. 57,347 (1983) (final determination) (where a comparable surrogate was un-
cooperative and no other comparable country manufactured the product).
32 S. REP., supra note 28, at 108; see also H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 41
(1984).
33 S. REP., supra note 28, at 108; see also H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 41
(1984).
34 For example, in 1984, an "artificial pricing provision" was proposed under which
Commerce was to determine foreign market value on the basis of the "lowest free market
price" of the imported article in the U.S. market, if that price was a competitive free mar-
ket price, as an alternative to the statutory "surrogate country" test. See H.R. REP. No.
725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1984).
35 Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 325.
36 "Comparable" merchandise is defined more broadly than "such or similar" mer-
chandise in the present statute. Because quality differences might account for price differ-
ences, Commerce was to make appropriate quality adjustments to compensate for
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dise produced in an eligible 37 market economy country accounting
for the largest volume of United States imports in the most recent
period. If Commerce were to find no such eligible market economy
country, constructed value of comparable merchandise in a market
economy would be used in establishing the FMV with which to com-
pare the NME's U.S. prices.38
The Administration also proposed a benchmark test, but in-
sisted that the benchmark measure of dumping be the lowest import
price to the United States from an eligible market economy coun-
try. 3 9 Some business groups opposed this formulation and sup-
ported instead the use of the average price for the largest volume
exporter;40 others, rejecting pricing tests altogether, proposed that a
finding of injury be sufficient to impose duties on NME imports.4 1
Still others favored a "factors of production" approach in lieu of a
benchmark test, if petitioner so requested. 42 Representatives of
NMEs, such as the People's Republic of China,43 objected to any
benchmark based upon largest volume, and proposed instead the
differences between the benchmark and the NME merchandise subject to investigation.
See S. REP., supra note 28, at 106.
37 The Senate Bill, supra note 11, defined the term "eligible market economy coun-
try," as any country that is not a nonmarket economy country, where comparable goods
are produced and exported, and which Commerce determines is appropriate, taking into
account factors including, but not limited to:
(1) whether comparable goods from that country are subject to an an-
tidumping or countervailing duty order (or agreement suspending any such
investigation);
(2) whether any international agreement affecting the price or quantity of
imports is in effect; or,
(3) whether the level of imports is de minimis.
Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2032. The Senate provision was struck in con-
ference. Id.
38 If such merchandise was subject to an antidumping order or there was reason to
believe it was usually sold at less than fair value, Commerce would calculate foreign market
value from the "factors of production" incurred in producing the merchandise plus those
amounts specified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982), for profits, expenses, and packing. Fac-
tors of production would include hours of labor, quantities of raw materials, utilities, capi-
tal costs, and other relevant factors. This provision may be particularly apt in the context
of commodity or fungible product cases where factors of production (e.g., through-put
rates) are typically publicly available.
39 See 1987 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 652-53 (statement of Commerce Deputy
Assistant Secretary G. Kaplan).
40 Id. at 559 (for example, statement of Labor Industry Coalition for International
Trade (LICIT)).
41 Id. at 581 (statement of U.S. Council for International Business); id. at 281 (state-
ment of U.S. Chamber of Commerce Task Force).
42 Id. at 1131 (statement of Trade Reform Action Coalition (TRAC) supporting
either a factors of production approach or, alternatively, use of average price of all free
world (including U.S.) producers as a benchmark).
43 See id. at 612 (statement of Committee for Fair Trade with China). The conferees
retained a provision to require the Secretary of Commerce to study and report to Con-
gress within 12 months "on the new market orientation" of the P.R.C., including the effect
of this orientation on the application of U.S. trade laws to China. In this regard, the Secre-
tary is to address "any possible need for changes in ... [the AD law] to deal more appro-
priately with countries in transition to more market-oriented economies." House Bill,
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creation of a special country status that would enable the exporter to
prove that its costs of production were low. Most observers tended
to agree that while some objective benchmark would indeed create
predictability in the administration of the law, the choice of any
benchmark was an essentially arbitrary exercise. Virtually any bench-
mark formulation could be justified in one way or another. 44
Recognizing the arbitrariness of the exercise, the House and
Senate conferees agreed to an NME antidumping provision that re-
places the surrogate country methodology with a constructed value
approach based upon the "factors of production" incurred in pro-
ducing the merchandise in the NME, as valued in a comparable mar-
ket economy country. 45 The factors of production examined in any
given case are to include, but are not limited to, labor, raw materials,
energy and other utilities, and representative capital costs, including
depreciation. They are to be valued 46 using the best available infor-
mation in a market economy country, or countries. 47 In this regard,
Commerce is to use a country which is at a level of economic devel-
opment comparable to that of the NME under investigation, and is
also a significant producer 48 of the same class or kind of merchandise
as that at issue in the case. If adequate information to value the fac-
tors is not available, Commerce is to base FMV on the prices at
which such or similar merchandise of comparable quality is sold for
export from an appropriate market economy country or countries, to
other countries, including the United States.49 Omitted, therefore,
supra note 11, § 169; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 973; Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1336,
at H 1895; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2041.
44 For example, proponents of the lowest price test argued, inter alia, that NME product
quality is typically poor by Western standards thus justifying a low price. Proponents of
the largest volume concept argued, inter alia, that NMEs should not be able to price undercut
key suppliers to the United States.
45 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1316, at H1888; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2032.
46 In valuing factors, Commerce should seek to use, if possible, data based on the
production of the same general class or kind of merchandise at a production scale and
level of technology similar to producers under investigation. Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2032.
47 Commerce shall avoid using dumped or subsidized prices. See Joint Conference State-
ment, supra note 20, at H2032. The House had wanted additional language to indicate that
the prices used should be "market-driven," but the reference was deleted. See HousE
COUNTEROFFER ON AMENDMENTS TO THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY AND ANTIDUMPING LAWS
AND MARKET DISRUPTION IMPORT RELIEF LAw 2 (Mar. 23, 1988) [hereinafter March 23
HOUSE OFFER].
48 The term "significant producer" includes any country that is a significant net ex-
porter and, if appropriate, Commerce may use a significant net exporting country in valu-
ing factors. Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2032.
49 Id. Commerce is to avoid export prices which are distorted, and should attempt to
ensure that adjustments be made for quality differences in the merchandise compared, as
practicable. Id. The new legislation also defines an NME as any foreign country that Com-
merce determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing such that sales
do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise. Commerce's determination will not be
subject to judicial review, or otherwise contestable in any investigation conducted under
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from the present NME antidumping methodology are the use of sur-
rogate home market prices in determining FMV and the standard
constructed value approach.
B. Calculation of Exporter's Sales Price
One of the more controversial amendments considered by the
conferees involved proposed changes to the manner in which Com-
merce computes margins of dumping in cases in which the foreign
exporter and U.S. importer are related parties. While ultimately de-
feated in conference, the amendment, originally introduced by Sena-
tor Hollings, reflected the frustration that even in successfully
prosecuted cases, the dumping law was simply not affording a suffi-
cient degree of protection-as measured by the size of the dumping
margin-to injured U.S. industries. Before discussing the specifics
of the Hollings amendment, a brief review of dumping price compu-
tation is necessary.
In comparing a foreign producer's home market and U.S. prices,
Commerce will make certain adjustments in order to arrive at an ex-
factory price comparison for the merchandise involved. Adjustments
which Commerce typically makes to observable market prices in or-
der to derive ex-factory prices include adjustments for physical dif-
ferences in the merchandise sold in the two markets, differences in
quantities sold, and other differences in the circumstances of sale;
packing and delivery costs; and applicable taxes and duties. 50 The
statute and regulations prescribe the manner in which these adjust-
ments are to be made to the "United States price" (USP) and to
FMV.
Before making its computation, Commerce must first investigate
the structure of the transaction in order to determine the appropri-
ate USP to utilize as a starting point. United States price may be
based either on "purchase price" 5' or on "exporter's sales price"
(ESP).52 Purchase price is defined as the price at which the exported
merchandise is purchased by the first unrelated buyer prior to impor-
tation into the United States. It is used, most typically, when the
the law. Factors which Commerce must consider in assessing whether the country is an
NME include the extent of government ownership or control of the means of production;
government control over the allocation of resources, price and output decisions of enter-
prises and international transactions; and the extent of currency convertibility, freely bar-
gained wages, and openness to joint ventures and foreign investment. Id.
A special rule for suspension of NME AD investigations was also added to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Commerce may suspend an investigation based on a
quantitative restraint agreement if: (1) it is in the public interest, (2) effective monitoring
is practicable, and (3) it will prevent the suppression or undercutting of domestic prices
caused by the subject imports. Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1316, at H1888;Joint Confer-
ence Statement, supra note 20, at H2032.
50 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1982); 19 C.F.R. 99 353.10, 353.14-.16 (1987).
51 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
52 Id. § 1677a(c) (1982).
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foreign exporter and U.S. importer are unrelated parties and where
no imported inventory of the merchandise is held for later sale. As a
consequence, the final sales price is agreed to between the parties
prior to importation of the merchandise into the United States. ESP,
on the other hand, is typically used when an exporter and importer
are related parties (such as a parent/subsidiary relationship), and
where inventorying of the merchandise in the United States for later
sale is contemplated. It is thus the price at which the merchandise is
purchased by the first unrelated buyer after importation into the
United States.
To arrive at an ex-factory price in ESP cases, Commerce will
take into account, in addition to the adjustments noted above, direct
and indirect selling expenses incurred in the United States by the
related party. While Commerce will reduce the home market price
by the full amount of direct selling expenses incurred in the United
States, 53 it will only deduct indirect selling expenses allocated to
home market sales up to the amount of indirect selling expenses allo-
cated to the U.S. sales.5 4 The amount of indirect selling expenses
deducted from the home market price is known as the "ESP off-
set."155 Apart from selling expense deductions in ESP situations,
Commerce has never deducted profit attributable to the ultimate sale
of the merchandise either from FMV or USP.56
While not provided for in the statute, Commerce promulgated
the ESP offset rule in its regulations in 1980. 57 It maintained that in
order to ensure a fair pricing comparison, indirect selling expenses
deducted from the U.S. price should be offset by similar deductions
from foreign market value.58 "Not to take into account any indirect
selling expenses incurred on behalf of foreign market sales would be
patently unfair, as it would result in the comparison of incomparable
prices. '" 59 In Smith-Corona v. United States, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit stated that, without the ESP offset, comparisons
based on the ESP would be skewed to create a higher dumping mar-
gin; the offset was an attempt to achieve the fair comparison required
53 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(a) (1987) defines direct selling expenses as those which bear a
direct relationship to the sales under consideration. See also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STUDY OF ANTIDUMPING ADJUSTMENTS METHODOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATU-
TORY CHANGE 34 (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter 1985 COMMERCE STUDY] (direct selling expenses
include, e.g., credit expenses incurred on the specific merchandise at issue, or certain ad-
vertising expenses associated with the product).
54 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1987). See also 1985 COMMERCE STUDY, sUpra note 53, at 34
(indirect selling expenses are those expenses allocated to the sales under consideration,
from a general pool of expenses related to those sales and to other sales).
55 1985 COMMERCE STUDY, supra note 53, at 42.
56 A profit component is deducted, however, where further processing of the product
is accomplished in the United States prior to ultimate sale. See id.
57 45 Fed. Reg. 8192, 8192-93 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1980).
58 Id.
59 1985 COMMERCE STUDY, supra note 53, at 58.
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by the statute.60
The Hollings amendment 61 to the Senate bill would have elimi-
nated the ESP offset by prohibiting any deduction for indirect selling
expenses from foreign market value, while retaining the deduction
from ESP. The net effect would have been to increase the dumping
margin. In addition, the amendment would have required that profit
be deducted from ESP without a corresponding deduction from for-
eign market value. Here again, the effect would have been to in-
crease the dumping margin. In this latter connection, Commerce
stated: "We believe that to deduct profit from the U.S. price-be it a
purchase price or an exporter's sales price-while not deducting it
from foreign market value would result in the comparison of incom-
parable prices." 6 2
Proponents of the Hollings amendment 63 attempted to justify its
passage by arguing that the European Community (EC) does not
have an ESP offset rule, and that, under the EC Antidumping Regu-
lation,64 profit is deducted from the European equivalent of the ESP
in dumping cases brought against U.S. products. 65 Therefore, it was
argued, a similar provision would merely bring U.S. law into con-
formity with current international practice 6 6 and would not provoke
retaliatory measures.
Opponents contended,6 7 on the other hand, that there is a fun-
damental difference in the structure and administration of the U.S.
and EC antidumping laws. United States law requires Commerce to
impose dumping margins in full, even if they exceed the duty level
needed to eliminate injury. In the EC, however, margins are reduced
to a level adequate to ameliorate the injurious impact of the dump-
ing.68 The effect of the Hollings amendment in the United States
60 Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
61 See 133 CONG. REC. S8982 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (statement by Sen. Hollings
introducing the ESP amendment, section 339 of the Senate Bill, supra note 11).
62 1985 COMMERCE STUDY, supra note 53, at 59.
63 See Letter from Trade Reform Action Coalition (TRAC) to the House Ways and
Means Comm. (Oct. 28, 1987); Statement of National Association of Manufacturers 18
(Sept. 9, 1987).
64 Community antidumping proceedings are governed by Council Regulation No.
2176/84. 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 201/1, L 227/35) (1984) (corr.) (hereinafter EC
Regulation].
65 Article 2(8)(b) of the EC Regulation, supra note 64, provides for the deduction
from the export price, defined as the price at which the imported product is first resold to
an independent buyer, of a "reasonable profit margin." See also Antidumping Code, supra
note 8, art. 2:6, which provides that in an ESP comparison "allowance for costs, including
duties and taxes, incurred between reimportation and resale, and for profits accruing,
should also be made."
66 See 133 CONG. REc. S8982 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
67 See infra notes 71-75.
68 Article 13(3) of the EC Regulation, supra note 64, provides that the amount of duty
not exceed the margin; "it should be less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove
the injury." See also Antidumping Code, supra note 8, art 8(a): "It is desirable. . . that the
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would have been to increase existing margins by the full amount of
the computation, whereas inflated margins have little or no effect
under EC law. And as to profit deduction, opponents of the amend-
ment claimed that EC law requires deduction only for that portion of
a subsidiary's profits attributable to an independent importer-
which is often below a subsidiary's actual profits. 69 It would thus be
inaccurate to say that the Hollings amendment would merely bring
U.S. law into conformity with EC practice. Finally, it was argued that
the amendment was not limited to imports from EC countries. It was
made expressly applicable to all GATT signatories in order to .in-
clude imports from Japan. 70
The Administration vigorously opposed the Hollings amend-
ment, describing it as "a major shift in U.S. antidumping practice
and an attempt to unfairly stack the deck against importers." '7 1 Like-
wise, free trade groups opposed the amendment, contending that its
discriminatory application of adjustments would result in wider, arti-
ficially high margins. 72 An array of consumer 73 and industry74
groups adamantly opposed the amendment as well because, they ar-
gued, its application would increase retail prices, close U.S. subsidi-
aries of foreign producers, and impede foreign investment in the
United States. 75 While proponents nonetheless claimed that addi-
tional protections were needed under the antidumping law, the pro-
vision was struck in conference. 76 Although the House reserved the
right at that time to comment on the ESP offset in the Joint Confer-
ence Statement, none was included.
C. Transactions to Evade the Payment of Antidumping Duties
Under current law, the "importer of record" is liable for the
payment of antidumping duties assessed against the merchandise in
duty be less than the margin, if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to
the domestic industry."
69 I.V. BAEL & J.F. BELLIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY, EEC ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION LAWS 53 (1985).
70 See 133 CONG. REC. S8986 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
71 See Letter from Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Trade Representative, and
Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture to Senate Committee on Fi-
nance 13-16 (Oct. 30, 1987) [hereinafter Administration Position].
72 See, e.g., NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS ON KEY ISSUES OF
H.R. 3, at 12 (1987); see also Pro Trade Group Comments on the Omnibus Trade Bill of
1987 (Sept. 21, 1987).
73 See Letter from Consumers Union to House Ways and Means Comm. Chairman
Rostenkowski and House Conferees (Aug. 12, 1987).
74 See Letter from American Express, IBM, AT&T, Exxon, and others to Chairman
Rostenkowski and House Conferees (Nov. 6, 1987).
75 R.Z. Lawrence, Dangers of the ESPAmendment (study commissioned by opponents of
the ESP provision including the American Business Conference, American, Retail Federa-
tion, Automobile Importers of America, and the National Foreign Trade Council).
76 March 23 HousE OFFER, supra note 47.
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question. 77 Where the manufacturer or exporter of the product di-
rectly or indirectly pays or refunds the duty to the importer, current
law deducts the amount of the payment from the U.S. price, thus
increasing the dumping margin by doubling it.78 The prohibition
against duty absorption by the foreign exporter in the antidumping
context-a prohibition not contained in the CVD law79-has to do
with the purpose of the dumping statute. The law is intended to rec-
tify injurious price discrimination by increasing the level of observa-
ble market prices in the United States and, thereby, to offset the
deleterious effects of dumping on the U.S. industry. If the foreign
producer or exporter were to absorb the duty, that goal would be
defeated.
Because a number of U.S. industries believe that foreign export-
ers are not increasing their U.S. price levels by the full amount of the
AD duty, the Senate bill contained a measure80 which would have
enabled Commerce to declare a "sham transaction" and direct Cus-
toms to treat the U.S. end purchaser as the importer of record solely
liable for AD duties. End purchaser liability was established when-
ever Commerce determined that a manufacturer, producer, seller, or
exporter was purposely absorbing duties rather than increasing its
U.S. prices. 81
The Administration opposed the Senate amendment on essen-
tially two grounds: (1) that the provision was unadministerable since
entry documents reflect the identity of the importer of record and
not the identity of the end purchaser; and (2) that the end purchaser
would be unfairly penalized for actions on the part of the foreign
exporter of which it had no knowledge. As a result of these objec-
tions, the Senate proposal was dropped in conference. The confer-
ees expressed the view, however, that Commerce already "has
authority under current law and proposed regulations on the reim-
bursement of antidumping duties to address the concerns that gave
rise to this Senate amendment."8 2
77 19 C.F.R. § 141.1(b) (1987).
78 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.55 (1987).
79 However, duty absorption in the CVD context could give rise to an export subsidy
allegation and the imposition of duties to offset the benefit.
80 Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 322; there was no comparable House provision.
81 In determining whether a transaction is a sham, the Senate Report states that
Commerce shall look to, among other factors: (1) whether the manufacturer, seller or
exporter had actual notice of an antidumping proceeding; (2) whether the transaction was
accomplished through an unusual method of importation by or for the account of the
manufacturer, seller or exporter; and (3) whether the size and nature of the exporter's
U.S. commercial operations is insignificant. S. REP., supra note 28, at 95. The Report
further states that the U.S. purchaser will be required to pay antidumping duties "only
when there is a clear indication that a foreign manufacturer or exporter is knowingly tak-
ing steps to allow it to absorb antidumping duties, rather than increase its price to the U.S.
purchaser." Id. at 96.
82 Housx OFFER, supra note 47. See also Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at
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D. Monitoring Multiple Offenders; Private Remedy for Dumping;
Compensation Award
The conferees considered two closely allied provisions designed
to target multiple dumping offenders. The first would have ex-
panded Commerce's authority under the AD law to deal with recidi-
vist dumping; the second would have created a more accessible
private right of action for dumping by amending the Antidumping
Act of 1916.83 The conferees also considered whether a fund should
be established from duties collected under AD orders to compensate
individual domestic producers for injury caused by dumping. As will
be seen from the actions ultimately taken, the conferees moved very
cautiously in the multiple offender area, and, in addition, struck both
the amendment of the 1916 Act as well as the proposed compensa-
tion fund.
1. Persistent Dumping by Multiple Offenders
In an effort to make the antidumping law more effective in re-
sponding to the dumping of a product from a wide variety of coun-
tries, Congress enacted a provision in 1984 which authorized
Commerce to monitor imports of the same class or kind of merchan-
dise from "additional supplier countries" if there was more than one
antidumping order in effect for that merchandise, reason to suspect a
persistent pattern of injurious dumping, and the pattern was causing
a serious commercial problem for the domestic industry.8 4 While
this provision concerned the monitoring of imports of the same
product from different sources, there was no provision aimed at
monitoring imports of different products from an entity already
found to be dumping.8 5
Proposals by the House and Senate to address so-called persis-
tent dumping would have permitted an eligible domestic industry86
to petition Commerce to monitor imports 87 of related products pro-
H2042. The proposed regulation, which will appear at 19 C.F.R. § 353.26, will clarify the
current regulation. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,046, 29,067 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1986).
83 Act of Sept. 8, 1916, § 801, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982) [hereinafter 1916 Act].
84 1984 Act, supra note 4, § 609 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(2) (Supp. IV
1986)). Although Commerce has discretion to monitor imports, thus far it has declined to
accept any of the petitions submitted under this provision.
85 The report of the House Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 3 states that a
number of U.S. industrial sectors have been injured as a result of repeated dumping by
certain foreign manufacturers. Examples included the U.S. electronics, steel, and semi-
conductor industries. H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 148 (1987) [here-
inafter H.R. REP.].
86 An eligible domestic industry was defined as a U.S. manufacturer or producer of
merchandise "like" or directly competitive with merchandise subject to an affirmative de-
termination, or "similar enough" in terms of process of production and uses to be in-
cluded in the product monitoring category. S. REP., supra note 28, at 103.
87 Under section 165 of the House Bill, supra note 11, if Commerce believed, based
upon product monitoring, that there was a reasonable likelihood such products may be
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duced by a foreign manufacturer if that manufacturer had previously
been subject to an affirmative dumping determination. The ITC
would have determined the scope of the products to be monitored,
with authority to include a wider variety of products than would ordi-
narily be encompassed within the Commission's traditional "like
product" definition.88 Both the Senate and House measures would
have required that Commerce initiate expedited AD investigations of
the imports whenever the monitoring demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood that the products were being dumped.
The House and Senate Committee Reports accompanying these
provisions indicated congressional concern with the serious injury
that had resulted from persistent dumping by multiple offenders.8 9
The Administration agreed that "recidivist dumping ha[d] to be han-
dled differently from the normal dumping case and that more severe
penalties could be put on unilaterally and without retaliation by any
country that is suffering from recidivist dumping."90 However, it be-
lieved that persistent dumping should be addressed by international
consensus, and therefore opposed enactment of any unilateral meas-
ures, including monitoring provisions for multiple offenders. 9'
Largely due to Administration opposition, the House and Sen-
ate conferees struck all of the monitoring provisions in the multiple
offender legislation. The conferees, however, preserved the concept
of expedited AD investigations in the case of multiple offenders, but
dumped, it would monitor imports from a first offender. If the dumping of a particular
product was indicated, Commerce would be required to self-initiate an expedited an-
tidumping investigation, unless, in the case of a first offender, the domestic industry ob-
jected. An automatic finding of critical circumstances would also be required. See infra
notes 293-302 and accompanying text. Automatic monitoring would be initiated in the
case of a second offender, although the monitoring would encompass all imports from that
manufacturer; self-initiated cases would then result if dumping is in evidence. As to multi-
ple offenders, automatic monitoring within the same product category and related product
categories would be required, and expedited self-initiated cases could result. In addition,
a rebuttable presumption of "intent to injure or destroy" would arise in a civil damage
action under the 1916 Antidumping Act. H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 146. Section 324 of
the Senate Bill, supra note 11, contained similar measures for monitoring multiple dump-
ing offenders except that the number of offenses required to qualify for monitoring was
increased by one. Id. at 147. The Senate Bill did not contain any revisions to the 1916
Antidumping Act.
88 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982) defines "like product" as "a product which is like, or
in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an
investigation." The House Report provided examples of particular product categories,
which were to be based upon "a common primary manufacturing process"; all steel mill
products, all semiconductors, and all land mobile radio products were cited as examples of
product categories. H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 147.
89 See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 148 (noting that persistent dumping in the semi-
conductor industry and in other electronics sectors, including telecommunications and tel-
evision receivers has caused certain segments of the domestic industry to cease
production); see also S. REP., supra note 28, at 105 (stating that repeated dumping to gain
increased market share is seriously injuring identifiable industrial sectors).
90 1987 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 650 (statement of Gilbert Kaplan, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Import Administration, Department of Commerce).
91 Administration Position, supra note 71.
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limited such investigations to imports of short life cycle products. 92
In this connection, a multiple offender is defined as one with at least
two affirmative dumping findings of margins of fifteen percent or
more within an eight-year period in the same product category. 93
Short life cycle products are those that become obsolete within four
years. 94
Procedurally, an eligible domestic entity9" may file a petition to
establish a product category with respect to short life cycle merchan-
dise after two affirmative dumping determinations have been issued
against an offender. The ITC is to then determine the scope of the
product category within ninety days of filing. Thereafter, to the ex-
tent the merchandise at issue falls within the scope of the short life
cycle product category, Commerce must expedite an AD investiga-
tion when a significant percentage of the imports in that product cat-
egory are produced by a multiple offender. In cases involving a third
offense in the same product category, for example, Commerce must
make its preliminary AD determination within 120 days of the filing
of the petition. 96 No extension of time for making a preliminary de-
termination normally available for "extraordinarily complicated"
cases9 7 is permitted without the domestic industry's consent. In ad-
dition, Commerce is to make an affirmative preliminary finding of
"critical circumstances,"98 such that duties may ultimately be as-
92 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1323, at H1891-92.
93 Id.; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2036-37.
94 "Short life cycle merchandise is defined as 'any product that the Commission de-
termines is likely to become outmoded within four years, by reason of technological ad-
vances, after the product is commercially available.' For purposes of this provision, the
term 'outmoded' refers to a kind or style no longer state-of-the-art," Joint Conference State-
ment, supra note 20, at H2036. The conferees stated that a "product's life cycle should not
be determined by reference to the entire time period over which a product may be sold,
but should be considered to end at the point at which the emergence on the market of a
new product with superior cost or performance characteristics begins to affect adversely
the sales of the earlier product." Id.
95 The term "eligible domestic entity" is defined as a manufacturer or producer in
the United States, or a union or group of workers representative of an industry in the
United States, that manufactures or produces merchandise that is like the merchandise
subject to an AD order or suspension agreement, or is similar enough to such merchandise
to be considered for inclusion in the same product monitoring category including-such
merchandise. S. REP., supra note 28, at 103; Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at
H2037.
96 For an offender with three or more offenses the determination must be made
within 100 days. The standard statutory deadline is 160 days from filing. See 19 U.S.C
§ 1673b(b)(l) (1982).
97 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1323, at H 1891; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2036. The deadline for a preliminary determination in an extraordinarily
complicated case is 210 days from the date on which the petition was first filed. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673b(c)(1) (1982).
98 Critical circumstances are treated at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e) (1982). A petitioner
may allege "critical circumstances," defined in the AD context as injury by reason of mas-
sive imports over a short period of time. Upon a finding of critical circumstances by Com-
merce and the ITC, the law permits the retroactive imposition of duties on unliquidated
entries of the merchandise entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption 90
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sessed on a retroactive basis.
2. Antidumping Act of 1916 and Compensation Awards
In addition to reassessing and ultimately narrowing the scope of
legislation directed at persistent dumping by multiple offenders, the
conferees considered a House proposal that would have amended
the Antidumping Act of 191699 in order to make the law more acces-
sible to U.S. industries seeking a private right of action for dumping
against multiple offenders.' 0 0 The 1916 Act permits injured U.S.
producers to bring private treble damage actions in federal district
court against foreign exporters and U.S. importers who commonly
and systematically import or sell merchandise at substantially less
than its actual market value with specific intent to destroy or injure
the U.S. industry, or to prevent the establishment of a U.S. industry,
or to restrain or monopolize trade in the United States. While vari-
ous civil actions have been brought under the Act, no plaintiff has
ever recovered damages largely because of the burden of proving
intent.10' As a result, the House proposal would have amended the
1916 Act by establishing, among other things,' 0 2 a rebuttable pre-
sumption of intent in a suit against a multiple offender.' 0 3 Only sin-
gle, not treble, damages would have been recoverable in such a case.
Failed attempts in the past five Congresses 0 4 to amend the
.1916 Act provoked equally intense opposition from members of the
legal and business community when the issue was again raised. Op-
ponents contended that the 1916 Act is essentially an antitrust law,
designed to redress unfair competition originating abroad, which
was not within the purview of section 2 of the Clayton Act.' 05 As an
antitrust law, it was argued, the 1916 Act has a number of character-
istics not shared by the antidumping law. The 1916 Act is intended
to protect competition, not individual competitors; the AD law is
days prior to the date on which liquidation was first suspended (i.e., 90 days prior to Com-
merce's preliminary affirmative AD determination). See infra notes 296-305 and accompa-
nying text. A similar critical circumstances provision is contained in the CVD law. 19
U.S.C. § 1671b(e) (1982).
99 1916 Act, supra note 83.
100 House Bill, supra note 11, § 166; H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 148.
101 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 149.
102 Criminal sanctions would also have been repealed and "actual market value"
would have been clarified to mean "foreign market value." Id.
103 The House "multiple offender" monitoring provision had defined a multiple of-
fender as one against which there had been three affirmative dumping findings within a 10
year period. Id. at 147. The Report states that in the case of a multiple offender, a strong
primafacie case that the defendant clearly intended to injure or destroy a U.S. industry
would be established. The burden would then be "on the manufacturer-defendant to
overcome this presumption with compelling evidence." Id. at 149.
104 For a comprehensive discussion of attempts to amend the 1916 Act, see Remedies
Against Dumping of Imports: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess, 212 (1986) (statement of C. Barshefsky).
105 Id.
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designed to protect individual competitors from low-priced competi-
tion. 106 The 1916 Act provides for civil and criminal penalties for
past prohibited acts of dumping; the AD law does not make dumping
illegal and relief is typically prospective in nature. 10 7 The 1916 Act
condemns predatory price discrimination, not competitively neutral
price discrimination; under the AD law, price discrimination is deter-
mined without considering competitive market effects or balance of
harm.
Apart from the substantive differences between the 1916 Act
and the AD law, the Administration strongly opposed the House
amendment as a clear violation of the GATT and the Antidumping
Code. Article VI of the GATT 08 limits the response to dumping to
the imposition of duties in an amount no greater than the margin of
dumping; Article XVI(l) of the Antidumping Code' 0 9 states that "no
specific action against dumping of exports.., can be taken except in
accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement." By per-
mitting an additional unilateral response to dumping, the Adminis-
tration argued, U.S. international obligations would be violated."10
In addition, while the 1916 Act is itself GATT compatible because of
its status as pre-existing "grandfathered" legislation, such a drastic
change in the law as that proposed by the House would arguably
create new legislation, thus jeopardizing the Act's grandfathered sta-
tus. "If we adopt draconian GATT-illegal antidumping remedies,
our trading partners will simply enact mirror legislation to apply the
same penalties to U.S. companies."" ' I
The private remedy provision was dropped in conference, as
was a closely related House proposal to create a fund from duties
collected under each AD order to compensate individual domestic
producers injured by dumping." 2 Under the current antidumping
law, duties are paid directly to the Treasury Department and not to
the domestic industry. The defeated House proposal would have re-
quired the ITC to determine whether there had been injury and, if
so, the amount of compensation to be paid to each U.S. producer. 11
106 Id. at 160 (statement of the Antitrust Section of the ABA).
107 The limited exception to prospective relief is triggered by an affirmative final criti-
cal circumstances determination. See infra notes 296-305 and accompanying text.
108 The GATT, supra note 6, art. VI, para. 2, provides in pertinent part: "In order to
offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an an-
tidumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such
product."
109 Antidumping Code, supra note 8, art. XVI(I).
I 10 Administration Position, supra note 71. Some business groups also found a private
remedy ill-advised for the same reason. See 1987 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 84 (state-
ment on behalf of Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition (RITAC)); The Business Coali-
tion on Trade 9, Positions on H.R. 3, (Oct. 9, 1987).
I I I Administration Position, supra note 71.
112 133 CONG. REC. H2042 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988).
113 The Secretary of the Treasury would distribute the proceeds to certified injured
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Proponents supported adoption of the private remedy provision
as a deterrent to dumping, and the compensation fund provision as
fair to injured producers, which must bear the high cost of pursuing
cases." 4 Administration opposition to both provisions, however,
was largely responsible for their deletion in conference.
IV. Countervailing Duty Provisions
Two far-reaching House proposals ultimately rejected by the
conferees would have applied the CVD law to imports from non-
market economy countries and would have radically altered the man-
ner in which Commerce was to define and value certain domestic
subsidies (so-called "natural resource subsidies"). Other than these
provisions, both the House and Senate bills were generally limited to
clarifying existing law, or to strengthening the law where clear sub-
sidy practices arguably fell outside the purview of the statute only
because of the unique form of the transaction rather than its sub-
stance. Examples of the former included a clarification of the man-
ner in which present upstream subsidy provisions were to be applied
in the case of processed agricultural products; examples of the latter
included the treatment of international consortia and certain leasing
arrangements under the CVD law. It is to these types of provisions
that the conferees agreed, rejecting more radical changes to the
statute.
A. Application of the CVD Law to Nonmarket Economy Countries
One of the more controversial issues under the countervailing
duty statute has been whether the law should apply to imports from
nonmarket economy countries. The question springs from the very
nature of the CVD law itself.' ' 5 Generally speaking, the prerequi-
sites for a subsidy finding include the following elements: (1) the
government activity under investigation provides a special prefer-
ence to an industry, 116 or a benefit contingent on exportation'17;
parties. H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 150. Difficulties with the compensation proposal in-
cluded the fact that the ITC does not calculate injury on a producer-by-producer basis;
rather, it aggregates data to determine whether there is injury to the U.S. industry as a
whole. In addition, it does not now measure what percentage of the injury is due to factors
other than dumping. The Administration opposed the compensation award provision be-
cause it would "compromise the impartiality of the investigative process and be inconsis-
tent with budget practices." Administration Position, supra note 71.
114 See Letter from Trade Reform Action Coalition to the Committee on Ways and
Means (Oct. 28, 1987); see also 1987 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 1130 (statement of
TRAC).
115 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 138.
116 Cabot Corp. v United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dis-
missed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 566 F.
Supp. 1529, 1537, modified, 569 F. Supp. 874 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Carlisle Tire & Rubber
Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 838 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
117 G.S. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 37 (1919).
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(2) the special preference or benefit provides a competitive advan-
tage, 118 or an inducement to exportI 19; and (3) the extent of the spe-
cial preference or benefit is measurable. 120 In an NME, however, the
state's pervasive intervention in all sectors of the economy, including
ownership of all significant means of production, renders it difficult
to discern any norm of economic behavior against which a special
preference or benefit could be identified or measured. Application
of the CVD law is premised on market-oriented principles; the essen-
tial characteristics of an NME are antithetical to those norms.
The statute itself provides no guidance concerning its applica-
tion to NMEs, 12 1 and the Commerce Department has historically re-
fused to find a countervailable subsidy in investigations involving
imports from NMEs. The first CVD case against an NME involved
textile imports from the People's Republic of China.' 22 In the
course of that investigation, Commerce held special conferences on
whether the CVD law should apply.' 23 When in this and subsequent
cases Commerce refused to apply the CVD law to NME imports, 124
the Court of International Trade (CIT) reversed and remanded
Commerce's determinations holding that the CVD law does not dis-
tinguish between types of economies and that Commerce must apply
the law to NMEs.' 25 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) reversed the lower court ruling and thus sus-
tained the Commerce position.'2 6
In light of the court's ruling, the House proposed a measure re-
quiring that Commerce apply the CVD law to NMEs, to the extent a
subsidy could reasonably be identified and measured. 12 7 The legisla-
I Is Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 456 (1978); British Steel Corp.
v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 286, 294 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
19 G.S. Nicholas & Co., 249 U.S. at 37.
120 United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971); Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966).
121 In contrast, there is a special provision in the antidumping law that applies to
NMEs. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982); see also supra notes 22-49 and accompanying text
for a discussion of amendments to that provision.
122 Textiles, Apparel and Related Products from the People's Republic of China, Ter-
mination of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (Int'l Trade Admin.
1983) (petition withdrawn and investigation terminated prior to preliminary
determination).
123 Conference on Novel Issues, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,092 (1983).
124 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,371-74 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1984) (final determination); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg.
19,375-78 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1984) (final determination); Potassium Chloride from the
German Democratic Republic. 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1984) (rescission
of initiation); Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1984) (rescission of initiation).
125 Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985),
rev d sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
126 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
127 House Bill, supra note 11, § 157; there was no comparable Senate provision. See
also H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 138-39.
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tion was intended to ensure Commerce's application of the law
where possible, so that NMEs were not completely exempt from op-
eration of the statute. 128 The probable consequence of enactment of
this provision would have been an increase in CVD petitions against
NME imports, and because NMEs are not entitled to an injury test, a
greater likelihood that petitioners would prevail in these cases.
The Administration opposed the House provision, but did not
propose alternative language to afford the protection to U.S. indus-
try it agreed was needed. 129 A number of business interests likewise
opposed the provision, maintaining that government benefits pro-
vided to NME industries do not have the pernicious effect the CVD
law is designed to offset; i.e., they neither provide an economic incen-
tive to export, nor do they provide the NME exporter with a compet-
itive advantage.' 30 To proponents of the legislation for whom "a
subsidy is a subsidy," applying the CVD law to NME imports would
protect the domestic industry from the effects of NME subsidies,
which, they believed, could, in fact, be measured with reasonable
certainty.131
The House proposal was rejected in conference.13 2 In receding
to the Senate, which had no such provision, however, the House in-
sisted on strengthening section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974.'33
Section 406 provides for an ITC investigation of and discretionary
Presidential action to remedy market disruption caused by imports
from Communist countries. Under the statute, market disruption
exists when "rapidly" increasing imports from Communist countries
are a "significant cause" of material injury to the U.S. industry.
Since 1974, only eleven section 406 cases have been prose-
cuted;' 34 in only one case was relief provided to the U.S. industry. 135
Recognizing that the law did not adequately protect U.S. interests,
the House and Senate compromise effected three changes to section
406.136 First, "rapidly" was defined to mean a significant increase
during a recent period of time. Second, "significant cause" was de-
fined as "a cause which contributes significantly to the material in-
jury to the industry, but need not be equal to or greater than any
128 See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 138.
129 See Administration Position, supra note 71.
130 Statement of Occidental Chemical Corporation before the Senate Finance Com-
mittee (Apr. 22, 1987).
131 See Letter from Trade Reform Action Coalition to House Ways and Means Comm.
Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (Oct. 28, 1987).
132 Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2042.
'33 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982).
134 United States International Trade Commission, Annual Report 1987, at 22.
135 Id. In 1987, the United States and the People's Republic of China concluded an
Orderly Marketing Agreement restricting P.R.C. exports of ammonium paratungstate and
tungstic oxide for a five year period.
136 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1411, at H1904.
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other cause."13 7 Last, the conferees enumerated several factors for
the ITC to consider in evaluating market disruption. 38 The
strengthening of section 406 in such a way as to increase its accessi-
bility to U.S. industries was ultimately deemed by the conferees pref-
erable to the substantive and administrative difficulties inherent in
applying the CVD law to NMEs.
B. Domestic Subsidies
Perhaps the most controversial of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty amendments considered by the conferees involved the
question whether the provision by a government of low cost natural
resource inputs to local industries constitutes a countervailable sub-
sidy. 13 9 Under the "natural resource subsidy" debate, a subsidy
arises, it is argued, when a government provides to its local produ-
cers a natural resource used in the production of merchandise at a
price lower than that at which the resource is available to purchasers
abroad, and, at the same time, denies access to U.S. producers to the
low price. This pricing of the natural resource is claimed to allow
local users to manufacture downstream products more cheaply than
their foreign competitors and hence, the theory goes, enables those
producers to undersell products made with higher priced inputs.
The result is a perceived weakening of the competitive position of
the U.S. industry in relation to that of its foreign counterpart. In
order to more fully place the natural resource debate in perspective,
a brief review of the CVD law and the historic Commerce position on
the issue is necessary.
The present countervailing duty law authorizes the imposition
of duties on goods imported into the United States that have benefit-
ted from either export or domestic subsidies.' 40 As noted earlier,
export subsidies are countervailable, with only limited exception,
under both United States law and international accords. In contrast,
domestic subsidies are not tied to the export activities of the enter-
prise receiving the benefit; rather, they are provided to a specific in-
dustry or group of industries and may be said to encompass myriad
government activities that benefit firms by directly or indirectly low-
ering costs of production-activities ranging from the development
of infrastructure to the establishment of an investment tax credit.
137 Id.
138 The ITC is to consider "(i) the volume of imports, (ii) the effect of imports on U.S.
prices for like products, (iii) the impact of imports on domestic producers of like products,
and (iv) evidence of disruptive pricing practices or other efforts to unfairly manage trade
patterns." Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1411, at H 1904.
139 This discussion is excerpted from a more exhaustive treatment of natural resource
subsidies. See Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, Foreign Government Regulation of National Re-
sources: Problems and Remedies Under United States International Trade Laws, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L.
29, 38-47 (1985).
140 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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Many of our trading partners view domestic subsidies as useful
and legitimate means of promoting the general welfare and enhanc-
ing social and economic development within an economy. At the
same time, however, the GATT Subsidies Code acknowledges that
certain domestic subsidies may have potentially harmful trade dis-
torting effects. 141 Thus, as previously outlined, 142 in enacting the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to implement the Subsidies Code,
the United States specifically made certain forms of domestic subsidi-
zation countervailable.
Before one of the enumerated domestic subsidies can be coun-
tervailed, however, the Trade Agreements Act requires a finding that
the government program in question is one that is "pro-
vided . . . to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enter-
prises or industries."143  The Commerce Department has
interpreted this language to mean that government programs that
are generally available-for example, infrastructure development or
the investment tax credit mentioned above-are not countervailable.
So, too, to the extent equivalent benefits are made available to a
number of different user industries in an economy without govern-
ment restriction on the universe of potential participants, no
countervailable domestic subsidy would arise. The law thus requires
that a particular government benefit be sector specific in scope
before a countervailing duty may be imposed. 144
Although there are many kinds of domestic subsidies, no CVD
issue has aroused more controversy in recent years than the question
whether a subsidy arises when a government regulates the sale of
natural resources to its domestic industries at below market
(although not below cost) prices. 145 In a number of cases, Com-
merce has refused to find such government activity countervailable
because the benefits of government regulation were not provided to
a specific industry or group of industries. In addition, Commerce
has held that the existence of a price differential between a foreign
government's domestic sales and export sales (known as "dual" or
"two-tiered" pricing), or the existence of a higher world price for the
natural resource in question, does not, in and of itself, give rise to a
141 Subsidies Code, supra note 7, art. 11:2.
142 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text for an enumeration of the types of
countervailable domestic subsidies listed in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982).
143 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982).
144 The rationale for the sector-specificity requirement is that governments intervene
in the marketplace in myriad ways. The sector specificity test is one way in which to distin-
guish acceptable (i.e. noncountervailable) government interventions from unacceptable
(i.e. countervailable) activity. Without such a distinction, it is argued, virtually every prod-
uct entering the stream of commerce would be countervailable. Carlisle Tire & Rubber
Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 838 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
145 In many cases, natural resources constitute the major portion of the value of a
product. For example, natural gas constitutes well over 50% of the cost of producing
nitrogen-based fertilizers such as ammonia.
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countervailable subsidy. Commerce's interpretation of the statute
thus resulted in controversial negative countervailing duty rulings in-
volving energy-intensive exports from Mexico 146 (e.g., ammonia, car-
bon black, cement and float glass), and Canadian softwood
lumber. 14 7
Dissatisfied with the Commerce Department's interpretation of
the sector-specificity test and its rejection of dual or two-tiered pric-
ing as a basis upon which to find a countervailable subsidy, United
States ammonia, cement, and carbon black producers turned their
efforts to Congress seeking a legislative reversal of Commerce's rul-
ings. A number of natural resource subsidy bills were thus intro-
duced in 1983-84 and have, in various forms, been introduced in
every subsequent year.' 48 The thrust of those bills 149 has been to
find generally available government programs countervailable.
146 See, e.g., Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (Int'l
Trade Admin. 1983) (final determination) (domestic price for natural gas in Mexico,
although lower than the Mexican export price or U.S. price, not a countervailable subsidy
because not provided at preferential rates to a specific industry); Carbon Black from Mex-
ico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, (Int'l Trade Admin. 1983) (final determination) (price differen-
tial between export and domestic Mexican petroleum feedstock available to all industrial
users not considered a benefit to a specific industry and, therefore, not countervailable).
The Carbon Black decision was subsequently reversed by the CIT in Cabot Corp. v. United
States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
147 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1983) (final determination) (Canadian stumpage program under which rights to
standing timber were sold held not countervailable because program was available to wide
array of industries in Canada on equal terms and was not targeted to a specific industry).
Following the Cabot decision, Commerce reached a contrary result in a subsequent Cana-
dian lumber case. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 51 Fed. Reg.
37,453 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1986) (preliminary determination).
148 H.R. 4784, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H7939 (daily ed. July 26, 1984),
introduced by Congressman Gibbons of Florida, would have imposed countervailing du-
ties on products that incorporated significant natural resource inputs if those inputs were
provided by a government to the foreign exporter at less than the export price of the
resource and if the natural resource was not freely available to U.S. producers for export
to the United States. The subsidy would have equalled the difference between the domes-
tic price of the natural resource and the export price and wouil have been applied to the
finished merchandise as imported into the United States. In 1985, Senators Long and
Baucus introduced a similar proposal in S. 1292, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). These
proposals formed the basis for legislation reintroduced in the ensuing years, including
H.R. 4800, supra note 11. See Barshefsky, supra note 139, at 47-58.
149 Apart from such legislative initiatives, in October 1985, the Court of International
Trade in Cabot Corp., 620 F. Supp. at 730, ruled that Commerce had misapplied the sector
specificity test when it found that Mexican carbon black, which was a one-use product
provided to only two users in Mexico, was generally available and thus not a subsidy. Sub-
sequently, in 1987, the CIT issued two major opinions on the sector specificity test: PPG
Indus. Inc. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Can-Am Corp. v.
United States, 664 F. Supp. 1444 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). In those decisions, the Court
stated that the sector specificity test required that in every case Commerce had to examine
the de facto availability of a government program in the country, and not merely its dejure
or legal availability. Applied to the carbon black situation, for example, this meant that
even though in law carbon black feedstock was available to all users in Mexico, in fact only
two companies in Mexico made carbon black and the feedstock had no other use. A sector
specific subsidy therefore existed to the extent the feedstock cost was less than the cost of
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Economy-wide regulation of a natural resource, as is the case with
energy inputs in many countries, would constitute countervailable
government activity even though such regulation pervaded prices in
a uniform manner throughout the foreign economy. The only ex-
ception to countervailability of such broadly available government
programs would have been for access: if U.S. producers were pro-
vided equal access to the natural resource at the low internal price
for export of the resource to the United States, no subsidy would
arise.
The House version of the natural resource subsidy provision
considered in this session of Congress deleted the words "natural
resources" from the earlier proposals, thereby creating a generic do-
mestic subsidy provision, and, in effect, substituted instead the words
"goods and services," which significantly broadened the scope of the
original proposals. 150 The House provision was divided into two
distinct parts: (1) sector specificity and (2) preferentiality.
The sector-specificity statutory language of the House provision
stated that, in determining the countervailability of a foreign govern-
ment program, Commerce must undertake a case-by-case analysis to
determine whether government benefits are actually paid to or be-
stowed on specific enterprises. Nominal general availability-that is,
general availability of a program under law, but not in fact utilized by
more than a limited industrial sector-would not shield a govern-
ment program from countervailability. The Senate bill also con-
tained de jure/de facto statutory language to this effect.' 5 '
While the statutory language of both bills attempted to codify
the dejure/de facto concept, the House Report language made clear
that, as the original natural resource subsidy proposals, the current
amendment would find all industrial inputs potentially countervail-
able regardless of their broad availability in the foreign country.' 52
The Senate Report language,' 53 on the other hand, was narrowly
drawn and essentially codified current Commerce practice in analyz-
ing domestic subsidies-a practice chastened by previous natural re-
source legislative initiatives and court rulings.' 54
The House, but not the Senate, also proposed a method for val-
uing certain subsidies; viz., whether goods and services were pro-
vided by a foreign government to a local industry at "preferential"
comparable fuel oils utilized by other Mexican industries. These 1987 CIT opinions were
issued after House action on H.R. 3.
150 House Bill, supra note 11, § 153; this measure "substitutes" for section 153 (defin-
ing domestic subsidies) and section 155 (resource input subsidies) of H.R. 3 as introduced.
See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 126.
151 Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 133.
152 H.R. REP. supra note 85, at 123-24.
153 S. REP., supra note 28, at 112-23.
154 See supra notes 148-49.
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rates. Assuming a countervailable subsidy is found, current Com-
merce practice for the valuation of that subsidy relies, in the main, on
a comparison between the prices charged the "favored" industry
with those available to other industries within the country under in-
vestigation. Under the House proposal, however, the value of the
subsidy would generally be calculated on the basis of prices outside
the exporting country-so-called "external pricing benchmarks."' 155
Thus, for example, assuming that the provision of low-cost Mexican
natural gas to industrial users constituted a countervailable subsidy,
one would compare Mexico's internal price for natural gas with
world prices, U.S. producer prices, or export prices in valuing the
degree of subsidization for duty assessment purposes. Mexican costs
of production for the resource in question, or the fact that it might
have a cost advantage in resource development and allocation over
other world producers, would be irrelevant to the computation.
Proponents of the House domestic subsidy provision argued
that absent a change in the law, U.S. industries would operate at a
competitive disadvantage vis-i-vis their foreign counterparts. As is
the case with many natural resources, particularly energy, U.S. pro-
ducers are forced to pay world market prices for their industrial in-
puts while industries located in resource rich countries which
regulate natural resource pricing do not face this disability. 156
Opponents of the measure,15 7 including the Administration, 15 8
maintained that its enactment (1) would unilaterally redefine the
concept of unfairness by countervailing natural cost advantage-a
radical departure from international trading norms; (2) would en-
gender retaliation and/or mirror legislation against U.S. exports;
and (3) would violate the GATT Subsidies Code.' 59 They argued
155 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 125. While there appears to be a hierarchy of valuation
standards-one of which allows for a comparison of the government's price with a freely
available and market-determined rate within the country at issue-in practice, in cases in
which a foreign government has any substantial involvement whatever in the good or ser-
vice (for example, in natural resource development and allocation), such that "market-
determined" rates either do not exist or are distorted, an external pricing benchmark will
govern the amount of the duty to be imposed.
156 See Natural Resource Subsidies. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, H. REP., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1985) [hereinafter Natural Resource
Subsidies Hearings] (statement of T. Bronson, Pres. & CEO of the American Cement Trade
Alliance: "The tremendous artificial advantage created by Mexico's fuel price subsidy en-
ables Mexican industries to enter markets in which they could ordinarily not compete.");
see also Barshefsky, supra note 139, for a more detailed discussion of proponents' views.
157 Natural Resource Subsidies Hearings, supra note 156, at 405 (statement of C. Barshef-
sky). Pro Trade Group, Comments on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987, at 27-30 (Sept. 21,
1987); The Business Coalition on Trade, Positions on H.R. 3, at 13 (Oct. 9, 1987); Coali-
tion to Promote American Trade, Objections to the Domestic Subsidy Amendment in H.R.
3 (1987).
158 Administration Position, supra note 71.
159 The Subsidies Code states, for example, that "(s)ignatories recognize that the
objectives mentioned in paragraph I above may be achieved, inter alia, by means of subsi-
dies granted with the aim of giving an advantage to certain enterprises .... Signatories
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further that section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 could be used to
address the issue at the heart of the natural resource debate-access
of U.S. producers to low cost foreign natural resources. 60
As the most controversial of the AD/CVD amendments, the nat-
ural resource proposal engendered numerous offers and counterof-
fers between the conferees,' 6' largely characterized by the words
"House recedes" (as offered by the Senate) and "Senate recedes" (as
offered by the House). Because of its highly controversial nature and
fears of retaliation or the implementation of foreign mirror legisla-
tion, however, the House conferees ultimately receded to the Sen-
ate's narrow provision, supplemented by language in the Joint
Conference Statement. The resolution of the natural resource de-
bate for this Congress' 62 was thus to accept the Senate's statutory de
jure/de facto test for determining sector specificity (and hence,
countervailability), with accompanying language directing that the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative request a section 332 ITC
investigation 63 into, and self-initiate section 301 actions 16 against,
foreign investment barriers. 165 The natural resource issue was thus
addressed by the conferees in a manner fully consistent with U.S.
international obligations. Its resolution also reflects an awareness
on the part of the conferees that the long-term solution to U.S. com-
petitiveness in natural resource-based products is not to countervail,
in piecemeal fashion, imports of those products-especially at the
potential expense of U.S. export performance-but instead to re-
duce barriers to U.S. investment in resource-rich countries.
note that the above forms of subsidies are normally granted either regionally or by sec-
tor." Subsidies Code, supra note 7, art. 11:3.
160 See supra note 2.
161 See Senate offers of March 15, 30, and 31 (1987); see House offers of March 23 and
29 (1987).
162 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1312, at H 1887; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2031.
163 Under section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), the ITC has
broad authority to investigate issues related to the operation and effect of U.S. customs
laws and to report to the President, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Sen-
ate Finance Committee at their request or on its own initiative.
164 See Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1301, at H1882.
165 Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H203 1. The Joint Conference Statement
provides:
The U.S. Trade Representative [is] to ask the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission to conduct a section 332 investigation identifying countries which
maintain investment barriers or other restrictions which effectively prevent
foreign capital from claiming the benefit of foreign government programs on
the same terms as domestic capital. The report should be submitted to the
House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and the
USTR. Based upon the ITC report, the USTR should self-initiate section
301 investigations to address those practices it considers to be the most egre-
gious unreasonable practices within the meaning of section 301 and to have
the most adverse impact on U.S. industries.
Id. For a brief discussion of section 301, see supra note 2.
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C. Calculation of Subsidies on Agricultural Products
In 1984, Congress enacted an "upstream subsidy" provision in
order to capture "subsidies bestowed on products at prior stages of
manufacture or production."' 66 An upstream subsidy is defined as
any subsidy conferred on an "input product" that is used in the man-
ufacture or production of merchandise which is subject to a CVD
proceeding, and that bestows a competitive benefit and has a signifi-
cant effect on the cost of production of the merchandise.' 67 A com-
petitive benefit exists when the price for the input is lower than the
price the producer of the merchandise would otherwise have had to
pay in an arms-length transaction.' 68 If Commerce determines that
an upstream subsidy exists, it includes the amount of the competitive
benefit conferred in its calculation of the countervailing duty on the
merchandise under investigation. 169
The upstream subsidy provision is particularly difficult to apply
to processed agricultural products, which may have benefitted from
subsidies conferred on the upstream raw agricultural input. This is
because commodities are, by definition, fungible, and are extremely
price sensitive. A subsidized price on the raw product, it is argued,
tends to set the market price for all of the supply of that product at a
given time. Thus, there is no market-determined price for the raw
input against which to measure the competitive benefit bestowed on
the processed product.' 70 "The upstream subsidies test, if applied
to agricultural commodities, would understate the magnitude of the
subsidy and permit wholesale circumvention of the countervailing
duty statute."' 71 Senators Grassley, Baucus, and Pryor thus intro-
duced an amendment to enhance the effectiveness of the upstream
subsidy provision in cases involving processed agricultural prod-
ucts. 1 72 The amendment was intended to codify Commerce prac-
tice,' 73 which had been overturned by the CIT.
The case that provoked the amendment involved a CVD petition
filed by U.S. hog producers and packers of unprocessed pork prod-
ucts against Canadian producers or exporters of live swine and fresh,
chilled, and frozen pork. ' 74 The respondents asserted that live swine
were an "input" to unprocessed pork, and that, therefore, the up-
166 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 170, repinted in 1984 U.S. CODE &
ADMIN. NEWS 5220, 5287 [hereinafter 1984 Conference Report.]
167 1984 Act, supra note 4, § 613 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1 (Supp. IV 1986)).
168 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
169 Id. § 1677-1(c).
170 See 133 CONG. REC. S8815 (daily ed. June 26, 1987) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
171 Id.
172 Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 338.
173 133 CONG. REc. S8815 (daily ed. June 26, 1987) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
174 Live Swine & Fresh, Chilled, & Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg.
25,097 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1985) (final determination), rev'd & remanded sub nom. Canadian
Meat Council v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 622 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (emphasis added).
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stream subsidy provision should be applied to measure any competi-
tive benefit bestowed on unprocessed pork by virtue of subsidies
provided to hog producers. Under this analysis, they contended,
Commerce would find no competitive benefit to the production of
pork.' 7 5
Commerce applied a two-part test in order to determine
whether live swine was a product different from pork such that an
upstream subsidies analysis should be employed: first, whether the
value added to the input through processing operations was small;
and second, whether demand for the input product was dependent
upon demand for the processed product. 176 It concluded that live
swine were not an "input product" to pork because the two products
were essentially the same, and that therefore the upstream subsidies
provision did not apply at all. 177 Commerce thus proceeded to eval-
uate subsidies to Canadian producers or exporters of both live swine
and fresh, chilled and frozen pork products, without the necessity for
separately analyzing whether any subsidy to hog producers con-
ferred a benefit on pork producers.
In an action contesting Commerce's final affirmative subsidy de-
termination, the CIT reversed and remanded, stating that: "By limit-
ing the applicability of the upstream subsidies provision, Commerce
apparently would, as in this case, automatically impute early stage subsi-
dies to later stage products on the ground that the products are es-
sentially the same at all stages."' 78 The court held that: "Absent
statutory recognition of special rules applicable to investigations
concerning early stage agricultural subsidies, there is no reason why
Commerce should depart from the course set by Congress under
section 1677-1 for determining whether upstream subsidies pass
through to later stage products in agricultural cases."' 179
The court recognized Commerce's concern that, under the up-
stream subsidy provision, if the benefit to producers of live swine did
not benefit pork producers, only swine could be countervailed, and
producers might circumvent duties by slaughtering swine prior to
export. 10 It stated, however, that "fear of circumvention is a con-
sideration which is accorded no role under the statute."''
175 Id. at 25,098.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Canadian Meat Council, 661 F. Supp. at 626 (emphasis added).
179 Id. at 628.
180 Opponents of the amendment claimed that the provision unnecessarily protected
U.S. hog farmers, who had misstated key statistics. See 132 CONG. REC. H3133 (daily ed.
May 21, 1986) (statement of Rep. Frenzel noting that a decline in Canadian hog imports
had not been offset by an increase in imports of pork meat). Proponents of the measure
claimed that Canadian hog producers did act as feared, slaughtering more hogs prior to
export and shipping pork products into the United States at lower rates of duty. See 133
CONG. REC. S8816 (daily ed. June 26, 1987) (statement of Sen. Pryor).
181 Canadian Meat Council, 661 F. Supp. at 629.
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The amendment agreed to in conference, and supported by the
Administration,1 8 2 codifies and clarifies prior Commerce practice by
requiring that a subsidy to a producer or processor of a raw agricul-
tural product shall be deemed to be provided to the processed prod-
uct if the processing operation adds only limited value to the raw
product, and if demand for the raw product is substantially depen-
dent upon demand for the processed product. The complications
inherent in an upstream subsidy analysis in processed agricultural
products cases are thus avoided.
D. Treatment of International Consortia
As discussed earlier, the countervailing duty statute provides for
the imposition of duties if Commerce determines that a country is
providing a subsidy to a class or kind of merchandise.18 3 In the case
of an international consortium, such as Airbus Industrie, t8 4 however,
several countries may provide subsidies to different entities that each
produce a part of a final product which is, in turn, exported as a
product of only one country. Difficulties may arise when the U.S.
industry that produces the final product files a CVD petition alleging
injury from subsidized imports of that class or kind of merchandise.
Current law does not expressly address whether Commerce may, in
such a case, investigate subsidies from all of the countries participat-
ing in a consortium to each of the entities which produce only a part
of the final product.' 8 5
A proposal introduced by Senators Danforth and Adams, and
supported by the Administration,' 8 6 amended section 701 of the
Trade Agreements Act, by adding that, in determining any final
countervailing duty on merchandise subject to a CVD investigation
that is produced by a consortium, Commerce shall cumulate, in addi-
tion to subsidies provided directly to an international consortium, all
subsidies received by the members of a consortium producing mer-
chandise subject to a CVD investigation. Covered are all subsidies
that assist, permit, or otherwise enable the members to participate in
the consortium through production operations in their home coun-
182 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1313, at H1887-88; see alsoJoint Conference Statement,
supra note 20, at H2031. Both the USTR and Commerce supported the amendment. See
133 CONG. REC. S8814 (daily ed. June 26, 1987).
183 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982). See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
184 The governments of France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and Spain each allegedly subsidize various member entities of the consortium in
addition to the consortium itself.
185 133 CONG. REC. S8714 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (statement of Senators Adams
(Wash.) and Danforth (Mo.) introducing section 337 of the Senate Bill, supra note 11).
186 Speaking on the floor of the Senate, Senator Bentsen stated that the amendment
was consistent with GATT obligations and was supported by the Administration. Id. at
S8715.
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tries. 187 The provision is intended to clarify existing law in order to
counter "a new and sophisticated tactic" to avoid inclusion of all
subsidies that enable the consortium to produce the final product. 88
The House, which had no such provision, receded to the Sen-
ate.189 The Joint Conference Statement provides that the amend-
ment would explicitly authorize Commerce "to investigate subsidies
provided at each stage of the production process by all participating
countries," and to "cumulate the amounts of subsidies from all such
countries" in determining the duty to be applied to the final prod-
uct.' 90 Commerce is thus to collapse its subsidy analysis and treat
consortium members as one company for purposes of determining
the total level of subsidization. 19 1
E. Leases Equivalent to Sales
In 1984, the AD and CVD laws were amended to provide that, in
addition to actual sales of the merchandise under investigation, the
laws were to apply to any leasing arrangements which were
"equivalent to the sale of the merchandise."' 192 Since that time, it
has been alleged that foreign manufacturers tend to structure leasing
arrangements so as to avoid the appearance of a sale in order to cir-
cumvent these provisions. 193
In this session of Congress the Senate originally proposed 194 to
delete the phrase "equivalent to the sale" in CVD investigations so
that the law would apply to all leasing arrangements. 195 In confer-
ence, the House receded with a substitute amendment, which identi-
fies specific factors that must be considered in determining whether a
lease is equivalent to a sale for purposes of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. 196 The objective is to ensure that various
187 Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2031-32.
188 133 CONG. REC. S8715 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
189 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1315, at H1888.
190 Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2031-32.
191 Id. While theJoint Conference Statement cites the Airbus venture, the provision may
well have potential utility in connection with other types of transnational manufacturing
arrangements involving products which require multinational cooperation and govern-
ment support. Id. at H2031.
192 1984 Act, supra note 4, § 602(a)(1)(C) states in pertinent part: "For purposes of
this subsection and section [1671d(b)(l)] of this title, a reference to the sale of merchan-
dise includes the entering into of any leasing arrangement regarding the merchandise that
is equivalent to the sale of the merchandise." 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis
added).
193 S. REP., supra note 28, at 125; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at
H2035.
194 Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 335; there was no equivalent House provision.
195 The amendment did not alter the antidumping law requirement that the lease be
equivalent to a sale of the merchandise under investigation. S. REP., supra note 28, at 125.
196 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1327, at H1893. The factors Commerce must con-
sider are as follows: (a) the terms of the lease; (b) commercial practice within the industry;
(c) the circumstances of the transaction; (d) whether the lease product is integrated into
the operations of the company; (e) the likelihood that the lease would be continued or
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forms of leases-including so-called "walk-away leases"' 197 and cer-
tain renewable short-term leases-do not escape operation of the law
merely because of their structure. 98
V. Injury Provisions
By and large, neither the House nor the Senate bills significantly
altered the substance or scope of ITC material injury investigations,
other than to devote some attention to higher-technology and other
capital intensive products that tend to require substantial investment
in continuous product development, and the principle of cumulation
described below. As the Joint Conference Statement demonstrates,
conferee activity tended to produce clarifications of, rather than sig-
nificant alterations in, current law.
A. Material Injury
Under the antidumping law and, in certain cases, under the
countervailing duty statute, before duties may be imposed the ITC
must determine that dumped or subsidized imports cause or
threaten material injury' 99 to a U.S. industry, or materially retard its
establishment.2 0 0 The House and Senate proposed certain statutory
changes to clarify congressional intent regarding the factors the ITC
must consider in its material injury and threat of material injury
analysis. 20 1
renewed for a significant period of time; (f) other relevant factors, such as whether the
lease would permit the avoidance of antidumping or countervailing duties. SeeJoint Confer.
ence Statement, supra note 20, at H2039.
197 The Joint Conference Statement directs Commerce to focus on the substance rather
than the form of a lease.
A renewable short-term lease or an indefinite walk-away lease for an item,
such as a large truck, commercial airplane, or heavy electrical equipment
would be equivalent to a sale where, for example, the product has been inte-
grated into the operations of the company or where there is a likelihood that
the lease will be continued or renewed for a significant period of time.
Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2039.
198 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1327, at H1892-93.
199 See supra notes 19-20.
200 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (1982). The House bill would have amended
section 771(7) of the Trade Agreement Act to authorize the ITC to consider whether im-
ports have historically supplied a substantial proportion of demand in a geographically
isolated market, and, in appropriate circumstances, to disregard imports into such a geo-
graphically isolated market in making its injury determination. See Joint Conference Statement,
supra note 20, at H2039. In dropping the provision, the conferees expressed the view that
"current law already authorizes the ITC to consider, in appropriate circumstances,
whether imports enter certain geographical markets where the domestic industry does not
compete, in determining whether dumped or subsidized imports are causing material in-
jury or threat of injury." Id. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(C) (1982) (regarding regional
industries).
201 Section 329 of the Senate Bill, supra note 11, contained the following amendments:
(1) ITC consideration in all cases of volume, price, and impact factors; (2) replacement of
the term "price undercutting" with "price underselling"; (3) consideration of an industry's
condition in relation to that particular industry and not in relation to other industries or
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First, under current law, among the factors the ITC must con-
sider in its analysis are the volume of imports; the effect of imports
on prices in the United States for the like product; and the impact of
such imports on domestic producers of the like product.20 2 In ana-
lyzing specific cases, however, there has been concern that not all of
the ITC Commissioners apply all of the factors, and that they do not
necessarily make clear which factors have been applied. 20 3 To rem-
edy this shortcoming, the conferees agreed to "clarify" that the ITC
is required to consider and explain its analysis of all three enumer-
ated statutory factors in every case, and any other factors that may
have been considered.20 4
Second, the statute currently directs the ITC to evaluate the ef-
fects of imports on prices by considering whether there has been sig-
nificant "price undercutting" of the U.S. product.20 5 It has been
alleged that certain Commissioners narrowly interpret price under-
cutting to mean only predatory pricing to gain market power.20 6 Be-
cause it is believed that below-market prices may cause injury
regardless of an intent to obtain market power, however, the confer-
ees replaced the term "price undercutting" with "price under-
selling." In evaluating the effects of imports on prices, the ITC must
thus consider not only predatory pricing to gain market power, but
also below-market prices that have an injurious effect. 20 7
Third, existing law also requires the ITC in its material injury
analysis to examine the impact of dumped or subsidized imports on
the affected industry by considering "all relevant economic factors
which have a bearing on the state of the industry. '20 8 In this connec-
tion, at least three statutory factors must be evaluated: first, an ac-
tual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits,
productivity, return on investment, and utilization of capacity; sec-
ond, factors affecting domestic prices; and third, actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, ability to raise capital, and investment. The conferees added
manufacturers as a whole; (4) examination of existing efforts by the U.S. industry to de-
velop technology necessary to produce later-generation products; and (5) consideration of
only domestic production facilities and operations of U.S. producers in assessing the im-
pact of imports on the industry. S. REP., supra note 28, at 115-18. Section 154 of the
House Bill, supra note 11, referenced all of the factors noted, except the fourth. H.R. REP.,
supra note 85, at 127-29.
202 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
203 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 128.
204 Id.; S. REP., supra note 28, at 116. Both reports note that "certain Commission-
ers" do not follow the analysis prescribed by the statute.
205 19 U.S.C. § 1677(C)(ii)(I) (1982).
206 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 128; S. REP., supra note 28, at 116. See Certain Red
Raspberries from Canada, USITC Pub. 1707, Inv. No. 731-TA-196 (1985) (final determi-
nation) (views of Comm'r Liebeler).
207 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 128.
208 19 U.S.C. § 1677(C)(iii) (1982).
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a fourth statutory factor for the ITC to consider in determining the
impact of imports on the affected industry: the "actual and potential
negative effects on existing development and production efforts of
the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or
more advanced version of the like product. '20 9
B, Threat of Injury
The ITC may also render an affirmative injury determination in
a given case if it finds that dumped or subsidized imports threaten to
materially injure a domestic industry.210 The 1984 Act codified
some of the factors the ITC had previously applied at its discretion in
assessing the threat of material injury, and added other factors for
the ITC to consider.2 1' In the current legislative round, the House
proposed to add three new factors to the statutory list: (1) the likeli-
hood of diversion of the merchandise to the United States because of
restraints on exports to or imports into third countries; (2) whether
dumping in foreign markets, as evidenced by outstanding AD orders
or findings against the same party on the same merchandise in
GATT member markets, suggests a threat;212 and (3) the likelihood
of product-shifting between a raw and processed agricultural prod-
209 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1328, at H1893; see alsoJoint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2039. The statute states further that the ITC shall evaluate all such relevant
economic factors within the context of the business cycle and conditions of competition
that are distinctive to the affected industry. Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1328(2)(c), at
H1893. See Senate Offer on Phase II Issues at 23 (Mar. 15, 1987). As to later-developed
products, the Senate Report reflects congressional concern with the erosion of profitability
in the aircraft and heavy electrical equipment sectors where the loss of one sale can affect
the ability to maintain R&D efforts. See S. REP., supra note 28, at 117.
210 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2)(A)(ii), 1673(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
211 1984 Act, supra note 4, § 612(a)(2)(B) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(F)(i) (Supp. IV
1986)). The provision enumerates eight factors that the ITC must consider in its threat
analysis. The House Report summarizes them as follows:
(1) if a subsidy is involved, the nature of the subsidy (particularly as to
whether the subsidy is an export subsidy inconsistent with the Agreement);
(2) any increase in production capacity or existing unused capacity in
the exporting country likely to result in a significant increase in imports of
the merchandise to the United States;
(3) any rapid increase in United States market penetration and the like-
lihood that the penetration will increase to an injurious level;
(4) the probability that imports of the merchandise will enter the
United States at prices that will have a depressing or suppressing effect on
domestic prices of the merchandise;
(5) any substantial increase in inventories of the merchandise in the
United States;
(6) the presence of under-utilized capacity for producing the merchan-
dise in the exporting country;
(7) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the probability
that the importation of the merchandise (whether or not it is actually being
imported at the time) will be the cause of actual injury; and
(8) the potential for product-shifting.
H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 132-33.
212 Outstanding AD orders in another country indicate a "pattern of injurious export
practices," and thus a threat of injury. See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 133.
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uct when there is an AD or CVD order on one but not on the
other.2 13 The House provision also would have placed a burden of
proof on the foreign manufacturer, exporter, or U.S. importer to
provide specific and convincing evidence that previous findings of
dumping in other markets did not indicate a threat of injury to the
domestic industry. Failing such proof, the ITC could draw adverse
inferences. 2 14
In conference, the House receded to the Senate,2 15 thereby
eliminating the drawing of adverse inferences and the first of the
three factors proposed by the House, which were not part of the Sen-
ate provision. The Senate proposal, to which the conferees agreed,
requires the ITC in its threat analysis to consider whether dumping
of the same product by the same party in a GAT-member market
suggests a threat of injury to the U.S. industry, 216 and, in any investi-
gation of raw and processed agricultural products, the likelihood of
product-shifting. 217
Finally, the conferees agreed to add to the ITC's threat analysis
the same factor as that agreed to in connection with the evaluation of
material injury: The ITC is to consider "the actual and potential
negative effects on the existing development and production efforts
of the industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more ad-
vanced version of the like product. ' 218 This factor was proposed in
the original Senate bill, 219 and addresses the need to protect domes-
tic research and development efforts on second-generation
213 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 121; see Live Swine & Pork from Canada, USITC Pub.
1733, Inv. No. 701-TA-224, at 18 (1985) (final determination), aff'd sub nom. National Pork
Producers Council v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 633 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (upholding
the ITC's determination that the likelihood of product-shifting did not rise to the required
level to make the threat of material injury real or imminent).
214 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 133.
215 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1329, at H1893-94; see also Joint Conference Statement,
supra note 20, at H2039.
216 This provision addressed, for example, the threat posed by the Japanese outboard
motor industry which had been found to have massive dumping margins in Europe and
Australia. These multiple dumping findings, coupled with the Japanese industry's struc-
tural capability to endure suppressed prices, "creates a particularly strong inference that
injury is threatened." See S. REP., supra note 28, at 119. Dumping enforcement is increas-
ingly coordinated in a de facto way. For example, when a new exporter seeks to gain
market share through price underselling, the response of the domestic industry in Europe,
Canada, Australia, and the United States is to seek antidumping relief. Thus, there are
often multiple dumping cases. The effect of this amendment, particularly if adopted else-
where, is to put exporters on notice that they cannot continue to dump in other countries,
because those cases may well have an impact in the United States. It also may increase the
incentive for U.S. companies with manufacturing facilities in other countries to seek relief
from dumping there, because it may assist them in subsequent attempts to obtain relief in
the United States.
217 See supra note 214.
218 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1329, at H1893-94; see also Joint Conference Statement,
supra note 20, at H2040.
219 Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 330; S. REP., supra note 28, at 118.
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C. Cumulation
Prior to 1984, the AD and CVD laws neither mandated nor pro-
hibited the Commission from cumulatively assessing the impact of
imports on the domestic industry in cases involving more than one
country. Individual Commissioners decided whether to cumulate on
a case-by-case basis. The 1984 Act stripped the Commission of its
discretion in this regard 22 ' and provided that the ITC must cumulate
the volume and price effects of imports from two or more countries
under investigation which compete with each other and with the do-
mestic industry. 22 2 Since 1984, the practice of a majority of ITC
Commissioners has been to cumulate as well volume and price ef-
fects of imports subject to any antidumping or countervailing duty
order issued within eight months prior to an ITC injury vote in the
pending action.223 The House proposed to require cumulation of
the volume and price effects of imports from two or more countries
that were currently subject to any antidumping or countervailing
duty investigation, or subject to a previous investigation within the
past twelve months which resulted in a final order.224 Placing the
timeframe at twelve months preceding the initiation of the current
investigation would have altered ITC practice and was characterized
as an attempt to set a "reasonable time frame" for the cumulation
analysis.22 5 The House provision also would have required cumula-
tion of imports subject to an investigation within the prior twelve
month period that resulted in a suspension agreement or termina-
tion based on a quantitative restraint.226 The ITC does not currently
cumulate the effects of such imports. In conference, these provisions
were dropped.22 7
220 See S. REP., supra note 28, at 118.
221 See 1984 Conference Report, supra note 166, at 173.
222 1984 Act, supra note 4, § 612(a)(2)(A) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv)
(Supp. IV 1986)). Despite the mandatory cumulation provision of the 1984 Act, the ITC
had refused to "cross-cumulate" dumped and subsidized imports. See, e.g., Certain Car-
bon Steel Products from Austria and Sweden, USITC Pub. 179, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-225,
701-TA-227 to -228, 701-TA-230 to -231, 731-TA-219, at 11 (1985) (final determination).
In 1987, however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the ITC must
"cross-cumulate" less-than-fair-value and subsidized imports. Bingham & Taylor v.
United States, 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Commission now does so. The House
would have codified Bingham by mandating cross-cumulation to combat the hammering
effect from dumped or subsidized imports which have a simultaneous impact on the do-
mestic industry. House Bill, supra note 11, § 134; see H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 130.
However, this provision was dropped in conference. See Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2040.
223 See, e.g., Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Spain, USITC Pub. 1593, Inv. No.
731-TA-164, at 13 (1984) (final determination).
224 House Bill, supra note 11, § 154; H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 129.
225 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 130.
226 Id. at 129.
227 See March 23 HousE OFFER, supra note 47, at 7.
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No statutory provision requires cumulation in analyzing the
threat of injury and, as a'rule, the Commission has not done so. The
House proposed a measure requiring such cumulation "to the extent
practicable for imports currently subject to a pending AD or CVD
investigation and which compete with each other and the domestic
like product. ' 228 The conferees agreed to provide discretionary au-
thority to cumulate in threat cases.229
The 1984 Conference Report also specified that cumulation was
required for imports with only a "small percentage of total market
penetration. '23 0 The ITC has thus routinely cumulated imports
from various countries even where certain of those imports were
negligible.231 To address those cases in which strict adherence to
the cumulation requirement led to results that were "anomolous to
an objective analysis of market dynamics," 2 2 the House proposed a
limited exception to mandatory cumulation for negligible im-
ports.23 3 The Committee Report stated that in determining whether
imports would be considered negligible, the ITC was to examine,
among other relevant factors: (1) whether import volume and mar-
ket share were negligible; (2) whether import sales were sporadic
and isolated; and (3) whether the U.S. market for the like product
was price sensitive.23 4 Where the domestic market was sufficiently
price sensitive so that even a negligible quantity of imports could
result in price suppression or depression, such as may occur with
fungible products, the exception was to be narrowly construed. 23 5
The conferees agreed to this limited exception to cumulation, stating
that it was intended that the ITC apply the exception narrowly in all
cases so that it not be used to subvert the purpose of mandatory
cumulation. 23 6
Finally, the conferees agreed to a provision added in conference
by Senator Packwood, "that provides a special rule for investigations
involving imports from Israel." 23 7 The ITC may treat imports as
negligible and having no discernible adverse impact on the domestic
industry if those imports are from a country with a Free Trade Area
Agreement with the United States, in force and effect prior to Janu-
228 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 129.
229 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1330, at H 1894; see also joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2040.
230 1984 Conference Report, supra note 166, at 173.
231 See, e.g., Low Fuming Brazing Rod from France, USITC Pub. 1673, Inv. No. 731-
TA-245 (1985) (preliminary determination).
232 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 131.
233 House Bill, supra note 11, § 154.
234 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 130-31.
235 Id.
236 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1330, at H 1894; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2040.
237 Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2040; Omnibus Act, supra note 5,
§ 1330, at H1894.
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ary 1, 1987238 (Israel is the only qualifying country), if the ITC deter-
mines they are not the cause of material injury to domestic producers
of like products.23 9
VI. Additional Provisions
Various miscellaneous provisions agreed to by the conferees re-
flected a strong desire to ensure that AD and CVD findings cannot
be circumvented. Commerce is thus authorized to prevent circum-
vention of AD and CVD orders by foreign exporters that undertake
assembly or finishing operations in the United States or third coun-
tries, or that perform minor alterations to covered products or ex-
port later-developed merchandise. Concern over circumvention
extended to provisions designed to ensure the monitoring of down-
stream products in order to identify the diversionary impact of AD
and CVD orders on inputs, and specific anti-circumvention provi-
sions were put in place on steel imports. Action also focused on in-
creasing the deterrent effect of AD and CVD proceedings through,
for example, prohibitions against duty drawback for AD and CVD
duties, repeal of the AD/CVD duty exemption for U.S. government
purchases, and a clarification of the circumstances under which ret-
roactive duties may be imposed.
A. Actions to Prevent Circumvention
Commerce must issue an AD or CVD order following an affirma-
tive final determination of dumping or subsidization and, where re-
quired, an affirmative final injury determination. 240 The order
directs Customs officers to assess an antidumping 24' or counter-
vailing duty24 2 on imports of the class or kind of merchandise speci-
fied in the scope portion of the order.
Both the House and Senate Committee Reports expressed
strong concern over the potential evasion of the AD and CVD laws
by exporters that attempt to circumvent final orders through altering
their method of production or shipment of merchandise.2 4 3 Circum-
238 United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, signed Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653-87
(1985) (entered into force Aug. 19, 1985).
239 TheJoint Conference Statement provides that before applying this provision, the ITC
would first determine whether a domestic industry is materially injured by reason of im-
ports from Israel. If the ITC made an affirmative determination, the provision would not
apply. If the ITC made a negative determination, it would be authorized to consider such
imports as negligible and having no discernible impact on the domestic industry. The ITC
is to consider all relevant economic factors regarding the imports, including the level of
the imports from Israel, relative to both domestic production and other imports under
investigation, their effect on U.S. prices for the like product, and their impact on domestic
producers. Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2040.
240 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e(a), 1673e(a) (1982).
241 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1982).
242 19 U.S.C. § 167le(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
243 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 135; S. RzP., supra note 28, at 99-100.
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vention of orders on final products had been accomplished by means
of the assembly or processing of components in the United States or
in third countries; circumvention of orders on components had been
accomplished by transshipment to third countries for minor process-
ing operations. 244 The law does not currently address these at-
tempts to evade the scope of an order. Nor does current law address
circumvention accomplished by incorporating a component subject
to an order into a "downstream" product.
Several provisions were agreed to in conference 245 to remedy
these loopholes. 24 6 The first concerns merchandise assembled or
completed in the United States. If merchandise sold in the United
States: (i) is of the same class or kind as merchandise subject to an
AD or CVD order or finding, (ii) is assembled or completed in the
United States from parts or components produced in the country
subject to the order, and (iii) differs little in value from the imported
parts or components, then Commerce may 24 7 include the imported
parts or components within the scope of the order.2 48 Commerce
must consider such factors as the pattern of trade, whether the pro-
ducer or exporter of the components and the U.S. party that com-
244 Kamarck & Harr, Current Issues Relating to the Scope of Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Orders, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1987 13-78 (1987).
245 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1321, at H1889; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2034; House Bill, supra note 11, § 155; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 323(a);
H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 134; S. REP., supra note 28, at 96, 99-101.
246 Authority was also provided to tighten existing enforcement authority over quanti-
tative restraints on steel imports. Under the Steel Import Stabilization Act (title VIII of
the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, supra note 3), the President is authorized to enforce
quantitative restrictions on steel imports, as provided in bilateral arrangements with steel-
exporting countries. Section 195 of the House Bill provided explicit authority to enforce
these quantitative restrictions when the steel product is exported from an arrangement
country and transshipped or transformed in a nonarrangement country before entering
the United States. Any steel product that is manufactured in a country that is not party to
a bilateral arrangement (a "nonarrangement country") from steel which is melted and
poured in a country that is party to a bilateral arrangement (an "arrangement country")
may be treated for purposes of the quantitative restrictions under that arrangement as if it
were a product of the arrangement country. Section 323(b) of the Senate Bill contained a
similar provision and also authorized USTR to undertake additional actions to preserve
the integrity of existing steel import restraints. The House receded to the Senate. The
conferees stated that the "melted and poured" provision, (section 1322) of the Omnibus
Act, supra note 5, applies to products from foreign countries as well as to products from
U.S. insular possessions or any territory outside the customs territory of the United States.
The conferees also stated that imports from the insular possessions shall be treated in no
worse manner than imports from foreign countries under this provision. House Bill, supra
note 11, § 195; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 323(b); Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1322, at
H1890-91; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2036.
247 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1321, at 1889-90; see also Joint Conference Statement,
supra note 20, at H2034. In conference, the House receded to the Senate provision, which
is discretionary (e.g., Commerce may apply the order to the imported parts or components
but is not required to do so); the House provision was mandatory.
248 The House Report cites as an example of circumvention the importation of picture
tubes and printed circuit boards assembled by a U.S. subsidiary of the manufacturer and
then sold in the United States as television receivers. H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 134.
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pletes or assembles them are related, and whether imports of the
components increased after the order or finding was issued.
Another provision agreed to in conference addresses circumven-
tion of an order by shipment of merchandise to the U.S. through a
third country. 249 Commerce would be permitted to prevent evasion
by expanding the scope of an order on parts or components to in-
clude a final product assembled or completed in a third country
where little value is added to those parts or components. Commerce
is to consider the same factors as described above. The Senate Re-
port explained that this provision was intended to address two situa-
tions: when the order applies to parts or components sent to a third
country for completion or assembly (diversion), and when the order
applies to a final product from a particular country that attempts to
circumvent the order by shipping the parts or components to a third
country for assembly or completion (circumvention) and subsequent
export to the United States. 250
The conferees agreed to this provision, and to a measure to cre-
ate a rebuttable presumption that an investigation, an AD finding, or
an AD or CVD order on a finished product covers that product even
if altered in minor respects. 251 Raw agricultural products that have
undergone minor processing would also be included. To determine
whether alteration is minor, Commerce would be required to com-
pare the new and altered products, applying the following criteria:
their general physical characteristics, the expectations of ultimate
users, the channels of trade, and the cost of modification relative to
the total value.2 52
Commerce may also include later-developed merchandise within
the scope of a preexisting order.253 This provision was intended to
clarify and codify current Commerce authority, which has been rec-
ognized by the courts.2 54 Commerce is to compare the merchandise
already subject to the order with the later-developed merchandise,
applying the following five criteria:2 55 (i) whether they share the
same general physical characteristics, (ii) whether the expectations of
249 House Bill, supra note 11, § 155; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 323(a); Omnibus Act,
supra note 5, § 1321, at H1889-90.
250 S. REP., supra note 28, at 100.
251 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1321, at H1889-90; see also Joint Conference Statement,
supra note 20, at H2034. The Administration also supported this reform. See Administra-
tion Position, supra note 71. See also S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §5008 (1987), 133
CONG. REC. 2105 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987) (a bill introduced by Senate Republicans on
behalf of the Administration).
252 S. REP., supra note 28, at 100, The House Report cites, as an example of minor
alteration, the application of a fire resistant coating to cookware prior to importation. See
H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 135.
253 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1321, at H 1889-90.
254 Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2035.
255 See, e.g., Diversified Prods. Corp. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 883, 889 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983).
[VOL. 13
ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
ultimate purchasers are the same, (iii) whether the ultimate use is the
same, (iv) whether they are sold through the same channels of trade,
and (v) whether they are advertised and displayed in the same man-
ner. Commerce may not exclude a later-developed product from an
AD or CVD order merely because it is classified under a different
tariff heading than in the petition or order.256 Nor may it exclude
the later-developed product because it performs additional func-
tions, unless those functions constitute its primary use and represent
more than a significant proportion of the total cost of production of
the merchandise.257
In conference, the House was successful in gaining Senate
agreement to a provision requiring Commerce to notify the ITC
prior to issuing a determination with respect to any change in the
scope of an AD order or finding, or CVD order where the ITC has
made an injury determination. 258 The ITC may request consulta-
tions and advise Commerce if it believes inclusion of such merchan-
dise in the AD or CVD order would be inconsistent with the injury
determination on the basis of which the order was issued.2 59 The
genesis of this provision was prior disagreement between Commerce
and the ITC when Commerce has attempted to broaden the scope of
an order to include merchandise not included in the ITC's injury
determination.260
B. Input Dumping and Monitoring
Congress considered two additional measures to counter cir-
cumvention in the context of the physical incorporation into a down-
stream product of components subject to an order. The first, which
failed, would have permitted Commerce to factor into its AD margin
256 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1321, at H 1890. Commerce has maintained, and the
courts have held, that it is not bound by tariff classifications. See Royal Business Machs.,
Inc. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1007 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), aft'd, 669 F.2d 692 (Fed.
Cir. 1982).
257 The House conferees unsuccessfully attempted to have this paragraph stricken
from the statutory language and included as a sixth criterion for Commerce to consider.
See March 23 HousE OFFER, supra note 47, at 8.
258 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1321, at H1890; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2035.
259 The purpose of authorizing ITC advice is to ensure that any anti-circumvention
action taken is consistent with U.S. international obligations. The conferees, however,
expressed the view that it would be "relatively unusual" for the ITC to find that inclusion
of the merchandise is inconsistent with the prior injury determination; the conferees also
suggested that the set of issues addressed by the ITC in making its assessment would be
"relatively narrow." Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2035. While the ITC
can provide its advice in writing, the conferees cautioned that written advice is to be the
exception and not the rule; formal written advice (rather than informal communications)
should only be provided when the ITC determines "that a significant injury issue is
presented." Id.
260 See Kamarck & Harr, supra note 244, at 28 (discussing Certain In-Shell Pistachios
from Iran in which this situation arose).
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calculation the benefit to the foreign manufacturer of the down-
stream product of purchasing inputs at less than fair value-so-called
"input dumping." The second, which was agreed to, involves the
monitoring of imports of products believed to contain major compo-
nents subject to AD or CVD orders.
Congress first focused on the problem of "diversionary input
dumping" in 1984, when it considered a provision to remedy what
was then called "downstream dumping."' 26 1 Downstream dumping
occurred when a product subject to an AD or CVD investigation in-
cluded materials or components purchased for less than fair value,
which had a significant effect on the cost of producing the merchan-
dise under investigation. 262 If Commerce found downstream dump-
ing, it was to include the amount of the cost advantage derived from
that dumping (calculated as the difference between the purchase
price and the generally available price of the input) in its calculation
of the dumping margin on the final product subject to investigation.
The provision was dropped in conference in 1984; it was rein-
troduced in 1985 and was incorporated into H.R. 4800, a series of
trade proposals that were never enacted by the 99th Congress. 263
These earlier proposals were considered difficult to administer be-
cause producers of the allegedly dumped input were unlikely to co-
operate in an investigation involving the finished product. Thus, the
amount of the cost advantage to the producer of the downstream
product would be difficult to calculate.
To remedy this problem, in 1987 the House proposed a diver-
sionary input dumping provision,264 which would have based FMV of
the input on constructed value; FMV would have then been in-
creased by the difference between the dumped input's purchase
price and its fair value. In determining the extent to which the input
was purchased at less than fair value, the input would have had to
have been previously subject to an AD investigation that resulted in
an AD order, a suspension or a termination based on a quantitative
restraint (following an affirmative preliminary dumping finding). In
the case of an input subject to an AD order, foreign market value
would have had to have been calculated within the past six years and
was to be used to determine the existence and amount of the current
input dumping benefit. If the investigation was either suspended or
terminated, then the affirmative preliminary determination must
have occurred within the past six years. The value of the input
261 See 1984 Conference Report, supra note 166, at 172.
262 Id.
263 Senator Heinz introduced a similar diversionary dumping provision in 1985, S.
1493, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), a bill supported by the Trade Reform Action Coalition
(TRAC). See 131 CONG. REC. S 10082 (daily ed. July 25, 1985). TRAC continued to sup-
port the provision in 1987. See 1987 Hearings, supra note 1, at 1129 (statement by TRAC).
264 See House Bill, supra note 11, § 156:
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dumping benefit would then be calculated on the basis of the best
available information, including the prior affirmative preliminary de-
termination. 265 If, following these computations, Commerce deter-
mined that the method for calculating the fair value of the input did
not accurately reflect the benefit bestowed on the manufacturer of
the subject merchandise, it would have had the authority to make
adjustments to more accurately reflect the actual competitive benefit
bestowed.2 66
Two additional preconditions to application of the provision
were proposed: (1) that the input be so routinely used as a major
component in the final product that the cost of the input had a signif-
icant effect on the cost of producing the final product; and (2) that
there be evidence of diversion, i.e., declining imports of the input
and increasing imports of the final product.267
The Administration opposed the House measure, arguing
strongly that its implementation would violate the GATT and the
Antidumping Code and might provoke mirror legislation directed at
U.S. exports.26 The GATT and the Antidumping Code require a
comparison of prices for "like products. '269 To the extent an input
is transformed into a final product, it is not "like" the finished prod-
uct subject to investigation. Moreover, the Administration noted
that, with the exception of the United States, there is consensus
among GATT signatories that such input dumping provisions are in-
consistent with GAIT obligations.2 70
The input dumping provision was again dropped in conference
this year. In its counteroffer, the Senate receded with a three-part
substitute amendment accepted by the conferees which: (1) stated
that diversionary dumping, comprising both input and third country
dumping, should be included as a GATT negotiating objective;
(2) authorized USTR to submit an application to a foreign govern-
ment to initiate an AD action pursuant to article 12 of the GATT
Antidumping Code when third country dumping injures a U.S. in-
dustry;271 and (3) clarified existing law to permit Commerce in a con-
265 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 136.
266 As stated in the House Report, the "competitive benefit" test is not intended to
yield an arbitrary result. If, for example, a manufacturer purchased the input at prevailing
market prices, it would be unfair to hold him to some price "higher" than was realistically
available, and thus no competitive benefit would have been bestowed. Id. at 137.
267 Id.
268 See 1987 Hearings, supra note 1, at 660 (statement of USTR General Counsel A.
Holmer).
269 GATT, supra note 6, art. 6(l)(a); Antidumping Code, supra note 7, art. 2:1.
270 Administration Position, supra note 71.
271 The Antidumping Code, supra note 8, art. 12(l) provides: "An application for an-
tidumping action on behalf of a third country shall be made by the authorities of the third
country requesting action." Section 1317 of the Omnibus Act, supra note 5, sets forth
procedures for domestic industries to petition USTR to pursue U.S. rights under article
12. A domestic industry that produces a product like or directly competitive with mer-
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structed value case to disregard actual prices between related parties
for purchases of an input, and to use instead a reasonable estimate of
the cost of production of that input.27 2
Apart from the input dumping provision itself, both the Senate
and House proposed similar procedures to assist in identifying in-
stances of input dumping. Those procedures involved the monitor-
ing of imports of downstream products in order to determine
whether major component parts subject to an AD or CVD order
were being diverted into those imports.273 The purpose of the mon-
itoring program was to provide an early warning signal of diversion-
ary practices. 274 There is no such provision in current law.
The House receded to the Senate downstream product monitor-
ing provision. 275 It permits a domestic producer of a component
part or a downstream product to petition Commerce to designate a
downstream product for monitoring in order to identify the potential
diversion of components.2 76 The petition requesting monitoring
must specify the downstream product, the component part incorpo-
rated therein, and the reasons for suspecting that AD or CVD duties
have resulted in diversion of the component into increased produc-
tion and exportation of the downstream product. If Commerce de-
termines that there is a "reasonable likelihood" that imports of the
downstream product will increase as a result of diversion of the com-
ponents,2 77 the ITC must monitor downstream product import
chandise produced by a foreign country may submit a petition to USTR if it has reason to
believe that such merchandise is being dumped in a third country market and such dump-
ing is injuring the U.S. industry. If the USTR determines there is a reasonable basis for
the allegations, an application shall be submitted to the foreign government requesting
that AD action be taken on behalf of the United States. USTR is to then seek consultations
with the foreign government. If the foreign government refuses to take AD action, the
USTR is to consult with the U.S. industry as to whether any other U.S. trade action is
appropriate. See Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1317, at H1888-89; see also Joint Conference
Statement, supra note 20, at H2033.
272 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1318, at H 1889; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2033.
273 House Bill, supra note 11, § 164; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 323(a); H.R. REP.,
supra note 85, at 144-46; S. REP., supra note 28, at 97.
274 S. REP., supra note 28, at 99.
275 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1320, at H 1889; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2034.
276 A component part is an import that, within the preceding five years, has been sub-
ject to a CVD or AD order or a suspension agreement with respect to which the estimated
net subsidy or dumping margin was at least 15%, and is routinely used as a major part,
component, assembly, subassembly or material, in a downstream product. Joint Conference
Statement, supra note 20, at H2034.
277 Within 14 days, Commerce must determine whether there is "reasonable likeli-
hood," and whether (i) thecomponent is already subject to monitoring pursuant to a bilat-
eral agreement to limit steel imports, or (ii) merchandise related to the component and
manufactured in the same country has been subject to AD or CVD orders or several sus-
pended investigations, or (iii) merchandise produced or exported by the component pro-
ducer or exporter and similar in description and use has been the subject of 2 suspended
investigations or AD or CVD orders. Commerce is also to consider, if appropriate, such
factors as the value of the component in relation to that of the downsteam product; the
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volumes. 278 Commerce is to then review the ITC information in de-
termining whether to initiate an AD or CVD investigation of imports
of the downstream product, or to request that the ITC cease
monitoring.279
C. Processed Agricultural Products
In the area of agricultural trade, an issue that has sparked con-
siderable controversy is the ability of U.S. producers or growers of
raw agricultural products to be included as part of the industry2 80
against which the impact of allegedly dumped or subsidized imports
of processed agricultural products will be evaluated, and as an inter-
ested party28 ' with standing to file AD and CVD petitions.
Currently, the statute defines the term "industry" as the "do-
mestic producers as a whole of a like product .... ',282 "Like prod-
uct" is, in turn, defined as a "product which is like or, in the absence
of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article sub-
ject to investigation." 283 Applying these statutory definitions in agri-
cultural products cases has proven especially difficult. While
producers or growers on the one hand, and processors on the other,
do not produce a like product, there is often a high degree of substi-
tution between the unprocessed and processed form of the product,
and a substantial degree of economic interdependence between the
producing and processing sectors.
Farm groups have been critical of what they view as inconsistent
decisions by the ITC on this issue.284 Commission practice has been
to consider the following two factors in determining whether to de-
extent of substantial transformation of the component due to its incorporation into the
downstream product; and the relationship between the entities producing the component
and the downstream product. S. REP., supra note 28, at 97-98. In considering the value of
the component part in relation to the value of the downstream product, Commerce is to
consider whether such part or component represents a significant portion of the costs of
producing the downstream product. Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2034.
278 The ITC will publish reports on a quarterly basis and, if the relevant import vol-
ume increases by more than five percent per quarter over the preceding quarter, it will
analyze the increase in the context of overall economic conditions in that product sector.
Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2034.
279 The request that the ITC cease monitoring is to be made if the ITC reports indi-
cate that imports are not increasing and Commerce determines there is no longer a rea-
sonable likelihood of diversion. Id.
280 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
281 Id. § 1677(9).
282 Id. § 1677(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
283 Id. § 1677(10) (1982).
284 See Live Swine and Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. 1733, Inv. No. 701-TA-224
(1985) (final determination), aff'd sub nom. National Pork Producers Council v. United
States, 661 F. Supp. 633 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from
Brazil, USITC Pub. 1406, Inv. No. 701-TA-84 (1983) (final determination); Lamb Meat
from New Zealand, USITC Pub. 1191, Inv. No. 701-TA-80 (1981) (preliminary
determination).
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fine the domestic industry to include producers or growers of a raw
agricultural product:
First, the Commission has considered the extent to which the raw
product enters into a single line of production resulting in the
processed product. Second, the Commission has examined the de-
gree of economic integration between growers and packers, often
looking at the legal relationship between the two groups.
2 8 5
As evidence of the legal relationship, a majority of Commissioners
has considered the extent of vertical integration in the industry2 86
and the existence of a contractual linkage between the prices of the
raw and the processed products. 28 7 Commissioner Liebeler, while
agreeing with the first part of the test, has dissented from the major-
ity view on the second part, asserting that it "makes little economic
sense" to focus on the legal relationship in determining whether
there is the requisite degree of economic integration.2 88
The provision agreed to by the House and Senate conferees2 89
reflects the Liebeler view and amends the definition of "industry" to
permit growers or producers of a raw agricultural product to be in-
cluded as part of the U.S. "industry" when the following two condi-
tions are met: (1) the processed agricultural product is produced
from the raw product through a single continuous line of produc-
tion;2 9 0 and (2) there is a substantial coincidence of economic inter-
est between the producers or growers of the raw agricultural product
and processors of the agricultural product, based upon relevant eco-
nomic factors, which may, in the discretion of the Commission, in-
clude price, added market value, or other economic
interrelationships (regardless of whether coincidence of economic
285 Live Swine, USITC Pub. 1733 (holding that growers should not be included in a
single industry with pork packers because of insufficient economic integration).
286 Id. at 6. In Live Swine the majority found that 5% ownership of packing facilities by
growers was insufficient to constitute economic integration, whereas in Lamb Meat two ma-
jor packers were owned by growers.
287 Id. at 7. In Live Swine, prices for hogs were not linked by contract to prices received
by packers for the processed product, whereas in Orange Juice the price paid to the grower
was determined by the final selling price of the concentrate.
288 Id. at 21.
289 House Bill, supra note 11, § 152; Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 326; Omnibus Act,
supra note 5, § 1326, at H1893; see also Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2038.
The Liebeler view was also considered and found to have merit by the Canadian Import
Tribunal in a CVD investigation of imports of boneless beef from the EEC into Canada.
Boneless Manufacturing Beef Originating in or Exported from the European Economic
Community, Canadian Import Tribunal, Inquiry No. CIT-2-86 (July 25, 1986). This deci-
sion was the subject of a GATT panel finding which is currently "blocked" (i.e., the panel's
findings have not been adopted or released). Canada: Imposition of Countervailing Du-
ties on Imports of Manufacturing Beef from the EEC. SCM/85.
290 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1326(a), at H 1893. The processed agricultural prod-
uct is considered to be processed from a raw agricultural product through a single contin-
uous line of production if" (i) the raw product is substantially or completely devoted to the
production of the processed product; and (ii) the processed product is produced substan-
tially or completely from the raw product." Id.
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interest is based upon any legal relationship). 29 1 The conferees also
expanded the statutory definition of "interested party," the entity
which has standing to file a petition,292 to permit a coalition or trade
association which is representative of either processors, or proces-
sors and producers, to bring an AD or CVD investigation on the
processed product.293 The new industry and standing provisions are
subject to a "sunset clause" in the event the amendments are found
by GATT to be inconsistent with the international obligations of the
U.S.2 9 4
The conferees also agreed to add an additional factor related
specifically to agricultural products to those the ITC must consider
291 The provision states that, in addition to such other factors it considers relevant to
the question of coincidence of economic interest, the Commission shall
(i) if price is taken into account, consider the degree of correlation between
the price of the raw agricultural product and the price of the processed agri-
cultural product; and (ii) if added market value is taken into account, con-
sider whether the value of the raw agricultural product constitutes a
significant percentage of the value of the processed agricultural product.
Id.
292 Under current law, the following interested parties have standing to file an an-
tidumping or countervailing duty petition on behalf of an industry: (1) a manufacturer,
producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a like product; (2) a certified union or
recognized union or group of workers which is representative of an industry engaged in
the manufacture, production, or wholesale in the United States of a like product; (3) a
trade or business association a majority of whose members manufacture, produce, or
wholesale a like product in the United States; and (4) an association, a majority of whose
members is composed of interested parties described above. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(l),
1673a(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
293 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1326(a), at H1893. The definition of "industry" for
purposes of assessing injury and for standing has been the subject of dispute between the
United States and European Community as well. Standing is accorded in both U.S. law
and the Antidumping Code to the domestic "industry" which produces a "like product."
"Like product" is defined more narrowly in the Antidumping Code than under U.S. law as
"alike in all respects" or with "characteristics closely resembling those of the product
under consideration." See Antidumping code, supra note 8, art. 2:2. A provision enacted
in 1984 stated that the term "industry" was to include producers of the "principal raw
agricultural product" if they alleged injury as a result of imports of wine and grape prod-
ucts. 1984 Act, supra note 4, § 612(a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (Supp. IV
1986)). When the American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade filed AD and CVD
petitions against French and Italian wine producers, the Commission of the European
Communities, as well as foreign producers and domestic importers, objected to providing
grape growers with standing or to be considered part of the domestic industry for pur-
poses of determining injury. See Certain Table Wines from France and Italy, USITC Pub.
1502, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-210, 701-TA-211, 731-TA-167, 701-TA-168 (1984) (preliminary
determination). A GATT panel found the 1984 provision inconsistent with the GATT
Antidumping and Subsidies Codes. The panel's findings have not been adopted or re-
leased. Nevertheless to avoid retaliation and similar treatment of U.S. exports, the confer-
ees, in agreeing to the new definition of "industry" for agricultural products, provided in
the Joint Conference Statement that the provision would cease to apply if USTR notified the
ITC that its application would be inconsistent with U.S. international obligations. Joint
Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2038.
294 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1326(a), at H 1893; Joint Conference Statement, supra
note 20, at H2038. There have been several GATT challenges to the application of "like
product" provisions. See Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2038.
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in determining threat of material injury.2 95 In an investigation in-
volving both raw and processed agricultural products, the ITC is to
consider the likelihood of product-shifting; i.e., whether there will be
increased imports of one product if an antidumping or counter-
vailing duty order is placed on the other.
D. Critical Circumstances
Critical circumstances exist when a domestic industry is being
injured by massive imports of dumped or subsidized imports over a
short period of time.2 9 6 Import surges typically result when a for-
eign producer, responding to the filing of an AD or CVD petition,
rapidly increases its exports to the United States prior to a prelimi-
nary Commerce determination of dumping or subsidization, so as to
avoid the duty liability that, in the ordinary case, attaches to mer-
chandise entered on or after the date of the preliminary
determination.
Critical circumstances provisions are thus intended to provide
relief to the U.S. industry injured by imports prior to the statutory
completion of a case; the provisions are also intended to deter cir-
cumvention of AD and CVD duties by permitting their imposition
retroactively. 297 It has been alleged, however, that the statutory pro-
visions have not proven effective, primarily because of Commerce
Department reluctance to expedite its critical circumstances determi-
nations, and because the ITC has had great difficulty in applying crit-
ical circumstances criteria during the final injury phase of an AD or
CVD proceeding.2 9 8 The conferees have attempted to redress these
295 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1326(b), at H1893; see also Joint Conference'Statement,
supra note 20, at H2038.
296 In the ordinary case, Commerce has 85 days from the filing of a CVD petition, 19
U.S.C. § 1671b(b)(l) (Supp. IV 1986), or 160 days from the filing of an AD petition, id.
§ 1673b(b)(1) (1982), to make its preliminary determination of dumping or subsidization.
Upon an affirmative preliminary determination, Commerce is to order the suspension of
liquidation for all entries of the merchandise subject to the determination. Id.
§ 1671b(d)(l). A petitioner may allege critical circumstances in its original petition or at
any time more than 20 days prior to Commerce's final determination. Commerce will
determine, on the basis of the best information available, whether there have been massive
imports over a short period of time, and whether there is a reasonable basis to believe, in a
CVD case, that there is a subsidy inconsistent with the Subsidies Code, or, in an AD case,
that there is a history or knowledge of dumping. If Commerce finds critical circumstances,
then any suspension of liquidation ordered pursuant to the preliminary affirmative finding
will apply to unliquidated entries of the merchandise entered or withdrawn from ware-
house for consumption on or after the date 90 days prior to the date on which liquidation
was first suspended. Id. § 167 1b(c)(2). If both the ITC and Commerce make final affirma-
tive determinations of critical circumstances, duties may be imposed retroactively on un-
liquidated entries, subject to the 90 day limitation.
297 The GATT Codes require a preliminary finding of subsidy or sales at less than fair
value before the imposition of provisional measures. See Antidumping Code, supra note 8,
art. 10:1; Subsidies Code, supra note 7, art. 5:1.
298 S. REP., supra note 28, at 92-93. In order to obtain retroactive relief, Commerce
must find critical circumstances in its final determination and the ITC must find, in its final
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deficiencies.
The Senate proposal, 299 supported by major trade groups and
agreed to in conference, 300 makes three changes to current law to
facilitate the making of critical circumstances determinations. First,
if Commerce has a reasonable basis to suspect critical circumstances,
it may request Customs to compile statistics on an expedited basis on
the volume and value of imports to be used as a basis for monitoring
surges. The second provision clarifies that Commerce may make a
preliminary determination of critical circumstances at any time after
initiation of an investigation, including prior to its preliminary deter-
mination of dumping or subsidization. 30 Third, the Senate propo-
sal, as clarified by the conferees, requires that, if Commerce finds
critical circumstances, the ITC must examine whether the retroactive
imposition of AD or CVD duties appears necessary to prevent a re-
currence of material injury that was caused by massive imports over a
relatively short period of time and, in CVD cases, that will be difficult
to repair.30 2 In analyzing the "recurrence" issue, the Commission is
to evaluate whether the effectiveness of the AD or CVD order would
be materially impaired if the retroactive imposition of duties did not
occur.3 0 3 In this latter regard, the ITC is to examine, among other
factors: (1) the condition of the domestic industry; (2) whether the
import surge can be accounted for by efforts to avoid the imposition
of AD or CVD duties; (3) whether foreign economic conditions led to
the massive imports; and (4) whether the impact of the import surge
is likely to continue for some period after issuance of the AD or CVD
order.30 4 The conferees expressed the view that these changes
affirmative injury determination, that: (1) in a countervailing duty investigation there is
material injury that will be difficult to repair, and the material injury was by reason of
massive imports of the subsidized merchandise over a relatively short period; or (2) in an
antidumping investigation, the material injury is by reason of such massive imports to an
extent that, in order to prevent such injury from recurring, it is necessary to impose an-
tidumping duties retroactively. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(4)(A), 1673d(b)(4)(A) (1982).
299 Senate Bill, supra note 11, § 321; there was no comparable House provision.
300 The provision was supported by such groups as the Trade Reform Action Coali-
tion, whose previous critical circumstances proposal was introduced by Senator Heinz in
1985. See 131 CONG. REc. S10079 (daily ed.July 25, 1985) (statement of Sen. Heinz intro-
ducing S. 1493, the "TRAC bill").
301 "While the Committee believes that the Commerce Department has this authority
under current law, the Commerce Department practice is to delay any preliminary finding
of critical circumstances until its preliminary determination of subsidies or sales at less
than fair value, at the earliest." S. REP., supra note 28, at 92.
302 According to the Joint Conference Statement, "the key addition [made by the
House clarifying amendment to the Senate proposal] is a clarification of the standards to
be used by the ITC in assessing whether the imposition of retroactive duties is necessary to
prevent recurrence of injury. Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2037.
303 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, §§ 1324(a)(3), 1324(b)(3), at H1892 (amending 19
U.S.C. §§ 167ld(b)(4)(A), 1673d(b)(4)(A)).
304 Id. The Joint Conference Statement notes, in connection with these factors, that the
weaker the condition of the U.S. industry, the greater the need to impose duties retroac-
tively. The Statement also notes that efforts by exporters to "unload" excess supply on the
1988] 303
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should result in more appropriate and effective use of the critical cir-
cumstances provisions. 0 5
E. Duty Drawback Treatment
"Drawback" treatment provides for the refund of duties paid on
imported merchandise that is subsequently used in the manufacture
of goods for export. 30 6 Until 1984, only AD duties were considered
normal duties for drawback purposes. The Trade and Tariff Act of
1984 extended this treatment to countervailing duties as well. 30 7
Thus both dumping and countervailing duties are treated as regular
customs duties eligible for drawback treatment.
The House proposed legislation to amend section 779 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 to prohibit countervailing and antidumping duties
paid on imported merchandise from being eligible for drawback.30 8
The House Report stated the Committee's intention to overrule the
action taken in 1984, which was "counterproductive to efforts to dis-
courage dumping and subsidization." 30 9 The provision was agreed
to in conference, and AD and CVD duties are no longer eligible for
duty drawback.
F. Governmental Importations
Although there is no general statutory provision permitting en-
try of government importations free of AD or CVD duties, articles
imported by, or for the use of any United States government agency,
including merchandise classified under Schedule 8 of the Tariff
Schedules of the United States which enter free of regular Customs
duties, 31 have also entered free of AD and CVD duties. 31i The ex-
emption of government purchases from these duties was recently
highlighted when a significant U.S. contract for titanium sponge, a
strategic metal, was awarded to the Japanese, despite the fact that the
bid was based upon dumped prices. In an antidumping suit brought
by the domestic industry, Commerce upheld a 1961 Treasury deci-
sion to exempt stockpile purchases from the AD and CVD laws.
3 12
U.S. market, thereby "transferring economic hardship," may well call for retroactive du-
ties. Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2038.
305 Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H2038.
306 The drawback refund equals 99% of the duties attributable to the foreign, duty-
paid content of the exported article. The completed article must be exported within five
years of the date of importation of the relevant duty-paid merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1313
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986); H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 141.
307 1984 Act, supra note 4, § 622 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677h (Supp. IV 1986)).
308 House Bill, supra note I1, § 159.
309 H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 141.
310 Tariff Schedules of the United States Annotated, USITC Pub. 1910, sch. 8, at 8-1
to 8-6 (1987).
311 H.R. REP., supra note 85, 142.
312 1987 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 716.
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In response, both the House and Senate proposed adding a new
section to the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that, even if classified
under TSUS Schedule 8, such imports are not exempt from an-
tidumping and countervailing duties. The House provision prohib-
ited any exception for government imports.3 13 The Senate provision
would have exempted from coverage those articles imported by or
for the Department of Defense and subject to an MOU (Memoran-
dum of Understanding) in existence before May 16, 1987,314 or
those imports for which the market is normally limited to govern-
ments. The conferees ultimately agreed to end the duty exemption
accorded U.S. Government purchases of imported merchandise, with
a limited exemption for certain merchandise imported by, or for the
use of, the Defense Department.315 Both Committee Reports ex-
pressed the view that special duty treatment for U.S. government
purchases would be "inconsistent with the U.S. policy of acting
against unfair trade practices. 3 1 6
VII. Conclusion
The AD and CVD provisions contained in the Omnibus Act re-
flect a conviction on the part of Congress that the two trade statutes
are generally effective in addressing problems of dumping and subsi-
dization. While a strengthening of each law was nonetheless viewed
as desirable, radical alterations in substance or procedure were re-
jected. By improving the effectiveness of the laws in the manner ac-
complished, Congress avoided enacting proposals that could have
violated U.S. international obligations, thereby jeopardizing U.S. ex-
port performance, while ensuring somewhat greater protection for
U.S. industries faced with intensified foreign competition.
313 See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 142. Application of this amendment without ex-
emptions would, in the Committee's view, be inconsistent with international obligations
and, therefore, the Committee on Ways and Means stated its expectation that those com-
mitments would be renegotiated.
314 To avoid any conflict with international obligations, the exemption only covers
MOU's existing before the date on which the Senate Committee on Finance adopted the
provision. See S. REP., supra note 28, at 121.
315 Omnibus Act, supra note 5, § 1335, at H1895. The House receded to the Senate
with an amendment to limit the exemption to merchandise imported by, or for the use of,
the Department of Defense (DOD) if
(1) the merchandise is acquired by, or for the use of, DOD (a) from a country
with which DOD had a Memorandum of Understanding which was in effect
on January 1, 1988, and has continued to have a comparable agreement (in-
cluding renewals) or superseding agreements, and (b) in accordance with the
terms of the Memorandum of Understanding in effect at the time of importa-
tion, or
(2) the merchandise has no substantial non-military use.
Id. This would include, for example, the DOD Memoranda of Understanding with Israel,
Egypt, and Australia. Joint Conference Statement, supra note 20, at H204 1.
316 S. REP., supra note 28, at 121; H.R. REP., supra note 85. at 142.
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